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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this thesis is to show a transformation around the scientific revolution
from the sixteenth to seventeenth centuries against a Whig approach in which it still lingers in
the history of science. I find the transformations of modern science through the cosmological
models of Nicholas Copernicus, Johannes Kepler, Galileo Galilei and Isaac Newton. Since of the
enormous content, I shall only pay particular attention to Copernicus and Newton in which the
emerging sciences transformed the cosmos on what Alexandre Koyré calls from a “closed world
to infinite universe”.
As an interdisciplinary approach, I used the methods and inquiries from philosophy and
history to explain the cosmological transformation in the sciences. The first part deals on the
philosophic content of Michel Foucault and Thomas Kuhn which help to provide insight though
their systematic thoughts are incompatible. The second part deals in the historic contents from
Copernicus’ doctrine, De revolutionibus, to Newton’s mechanics, Principia. My ultimate
outcome is to demonstrate the multi-perspective dimension of knowledge in which
interdisciplinary studies shows transformation of the sciences and its effects on history.

Keywords: transformation, mechanomorphism, history of science, epistemic breaks, paradigm
shifts, Copernican doctrine, Newtonian mechanics, effects on history.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
In the history and philosophy of science, one knows of Thomas Kuhn’s essential writing,
or essay, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. A work he planned for 15 years before initial
publication in 19621. The work itself stands in the pivotal point discussing the nature of history
pertaining to the scientific revolution and the sociology of knowledge that emerges between the
standard scientific models, method and community. According to his preface, that was not his
initial goal2.
Kuhn’s corpus in the history of science became apparent that the sociology of science
was the unintended consequence of his developing thoughts changing professions from physics,
to history of science then philosophy; he wasn’t trained as either historian or philosopher. He
was outside the fields and that inspired him in his multi-lingual use of paradigm shifts: the
changing knowledge in different professions like the sociologist, anthropologist and psychologist
versus the biologist, physicist, astronomer, mathematician, and chemist3. Kuhn encountered this
folly of dichotomies early in his years at Harvard4: in the 50’s as a young fellow, he’s
environment of learning surrounded the president James B. Conant who revised Harvard’s
educational system of an interdisciplinary model that combines the humanities (e.g. arts, history,
and philosophy) into science to help elaborate the core concepts that transformed the sciences in
western history.
Kuhn’s The Copernican Revolution was an early synthesized work of history, science and
philosophy on the emerging disciplines that natural philosophers were conceptualizing in a
change of the cosmos around Copernicus’ time5. What interests me is the philosophical and
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historical implications that can help illustrate the rigorous methods in the mathematics and
physics and emphasize the strong relation between history and philosophy. According to the
medieval historian Ibn Khaldun, in the Muqaddimah, history “is a discipline widely cultivated
among nations and races. It is eagerly sought after. The men in the street, the ordinary people,
aspire to know it. Kings and leaders vie for it”6. Within the essence of history, through
Khaldun’s thought, lies an inner meaning which
involves speculation and an attempt to get at the truth, subtle explanation of the causes
and origins of existing things, and deep knowledge of how and why events. History,
therefore, is firmly rooted in philosophy. It deserves to be accounted a branch of it7.
In a sense, history and philosophy provide the tools in nations or civilizations as a theoretical and
practical matter that balances the disciplines of human knowledge.
According to William Durant’s Story of Civilization Part I, the elements of civilization
and their knowledge constitute the disciplines through the inter-connected links related to
economics, politics, religion, morality, arts, and sciences8. If one area is heavily concentrated or
misplaced to the others, then the whole working parts as an inter-connected link tumbles down
and one will see the decline of a civilization9. This interdisciplinary ideology not only applied
fifty to a thousand years ago with Durant, Khaldun, and Kuhn, rather it still applies now in our
modern civilization.
Given the disciplines and their knowledge are very interdisciplinary and integrated as a
self-governing entity, my speculations are particularly centering the arts and sciences within the
history and philosophy of the emerging cosmos that came out of Copernicus and Newton as a
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“closed world to infinite universe”10. The emerging, or origins, of modern science stems around
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries of the west which modern sciences throw off the
superstitious elements that cloaked human ingenuity over a thousand years or coming out of the
Middle Ages. This notion on the origins of modern science and its cosmology illustrates a Whig
approach/interpretation in the history and history of science which I disagree as the whole
concept in interdisciplinary studies through history and philosophy.
The history of science is not a one-sided approach rather an interdisciplinary outlook that
natural philosophers/scientists create the cosmos through this transformation that, according to
Webster’s Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary, is defined as “the operation of changing…one
configuration or expression into another in accordance with a mathematical rule”11. Hence this
rule succeeds through an epistemological thought operation shown in mathematics, physics, and
the sciences on a geometrical level of analysis. The transformative elements in the
geometrization of space in cosmology and its perceptions produced a transformation in the
history of science.
This paper is outline into two parts in the philosophical and historical investigation on the
cosmos. The first is to elaborate the philosophies not only to Thomas Kuhn with other historians
and philosophers but as well the French philosopher Michel Foucault in Foucault and Kuhn’s
approaches on epistemic changes and paradigm shifts. After tackling their philosophies, I would
transition within the contents surrounding Copernicus, Kepler, Galileo, and Newton to see how
this transformation occurred. To start off, I would like to counteract the notion of Whig history
as one of the few models in the nature of history and its effects.
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Whig history
Before going into Whig history, there is a difference in meaning following “nature” in the
context of the nature of history. According to C.S. Lewis in his Discarded Image, he divides
nature in two types12: the personification of nature as Mother Nature versus speaking in
abstraction of Nature like the pre-Socratics discussed on metaphysics. Of the two types, the latter
furthers in the history of science with how certain individuals were able to reconfigure the new
universe from Copernicus to Newton where the former sees the events as personified forms
through a literary context. I would think that transformations in history and history of science
follow the two types of nature where it provides a multiple perspective rather than one-sidedness
from the Whig perspective.
The term Whig history is one of many interpretations of history, especially in
historiography, which I shall address the concept used by the historian Herbert Butterfield. In
Butterfield’s book The Whig Interpretation of History, he provides on what he terms – beyond
political ideologies of eighteenth century Whigs and Tories and religious ideologies in Catholics
and Protestants – in Whig history as a victor/winner in history and the account of its past as
present. The first concept demonstrates, in Whig history, that the historian’s role must be taken
as an “avenger” to justify the means of a committed “wrong” that imbalances the nature of
history. To Butterfield, the historian stands as “a judge between the parties and rivalries and
causes of bygone generations”13 which the parties, in appearance, must stand to liberate the
individual in history. For example: Protestants must win over Catholics as English people who
affiliate themselves as Whigs must win over to the Tories.
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In Butterfield’s concept of history, he view these victories as an assumption which the
“verdicts of history” says something about the individual or group14. The point of departure is
classifying, or better yet defining, to whom these certain individuals are considered as the victor.
However, the ethnographic political display indentifies the victors of history as the historian in
writing “their” account or experience. Though the Whigs and Protestants were victorious at one
point against their opponents, at another period in history they may become the subjugation of
their opponents, the Tories and Catholics. The conundrum furthers in Butterfield’s second
concept of Whig history: the view of time.
The view of time is especially critical in account on what makes history history. History
is the study of the past but of what kind? Not every historian can fully calculate every significant
event or phenomenon, natural or human, in narration. Like the poets from ancient Greece and
Rome, the historians give a personified interpretation of all natural and human events yet cannot
fully account all such phenomenon down to its micro-proponents15. Instead, the historian, like
the poet, regulates a medium in narration to the reader beginning at medias res, in the middle of
things. The middle of things in narration then furthers the etiological function which may have
caused disruptions, declinations or reverberations in history. The issue that Butterfield defines in
Whig history is I inspect as one-sidedness in history.
This one-sidedness in the history of any specific inquiry, moral, scientific or political,
follows characteristics that may leave significant and insignificant details or ulterior motives in
usurping the “losers”. To understand the transformation of such knowledge or intellect that was
considered anachronistic, one must view all anachronistic tendencies which fall out of line in and
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failure develops out of its mistakes; this is to say anachronistic tendencies still play a role in
history. This role in nature, both description as personification and abstraction, resembles the
balances of order and cosmos as seen through cosmogony stories which tell of events before the
appearance of humanity. One-sidedness in history fails to account the speculation of time and
location beyond Newton’s or Einstein’s mechanics. To illustrate this point, Olaf Stapledon’s
narration in Last and First Men calls in question of the narrator or historian in telling the story of
mankind in the future which Whigs can postulate on liberations. In his introduction, Stapledon
states that the narrator maybe “one contemporary with its readers, [or] the other inhabitant of an
age which they would call the distant future”16.
The Whig historian must take in attempt, where this one-sidedness to liberation against
the confinements and cyclicality, the point in casting two narrators: one from the past and one
from the present. The “author” in Stapledon’s narration plays both as an historian and literary
personnel. However, which is the authentic historian? If the author from the future is our
historian, then the “present” author’s narration is valuable only to the extent of what the futuristic
individual can hold through one’s available knowledge in events occurring in time. If the present
author is our historian, then one is committing a fallacy in foretelling events that have not
happened; yet something can be said that such events in prediction can occurs if such the nature
is repetitive.
Though based on science-fiction about mind embodiment or out of body experience, such
speculation calls to the inquiring mind whether as historian, philosopher or scientist. In inquiring
specific histories, Butterfield makes note of importance that
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the greatest of all lessons of history is this demonstration of the complexity of human
change and the unpredictable character of the ultimate character of the ultimate
consequence of any given act or decision of men; and of the face of it this is a lesson that
can only be learned in detail17.
The lessons of history are a difficult task in covering an enormous content in history for which
my investigation rely on an interdisciplinary approach that can illuminate trivialites when
looking at the sciences. From understanding his notion on Whig interpretation and faults,
Butterfield expands from a general history to a specific history on its philosophy in the history of
science known in The Origins of Modern Science.
Notes
[1] Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1962), pg.
xxxiv
[2] Ibid, pgs. xliv-xlvi
[3] Ibid, pg.xlii
[4] See Conant’s foreword in Kuhn’s The Copernican Revolution (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1957) and Structure, pg. xl
[5] Kuhn (1957), preface, pgs. vii-viii
[6] Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah (New York: Princeton University Press, 1967), pg.6
[7] ibid.
[8] William Durant, The Story of Civilization Part I (New York: Simon and Schuster, Inc., 1935), pg.1
[9] ibid, pg. 3
[10] I like this philosophic concept from Koyre’s overall perspective in the history of science dealing on
cosmology; this comes from his title From the Closed World to Open Universe (Baltimore: John Hopkins
Press, 1957).
[11] See Webster’s Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary (G&C. Merriam Company Publishers, 1967),
pg.940
[12] C.S. Lewis, The Discarded Image (Cambridge: The University of Cambridge Press, 1964), pgs.37-38
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[13] Herbert Butterfield, The Whig Interpretation of History (New York: W.W. Norton & Company,
1965), pg.1
[14] Ibid., pg.2
[15] In historiography, this is called bottom-up and micro history
[16] Olaf Stapledon, Last and First Men (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 2008), pg.13
[17] Butterfield, pg.21
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CHAPTER TWO: THE FOUCAULT-KUHN SHIFT
What I detect is the early philosophy in the history of science and its transformation from
Butterfield’s work in The Origins of Modern Science and Alexandre Koyré’s From the Closed
World to Infinite Universe; the first address the historic aspect while the latter deals the
philosophic aspect in the history of science. Butterfield advises the general historian to pay
particular attentions in the shifts of human interactions when The Origins of Modern Science
looks to a teleological function affirming successes that the lessons of history have been learned.
Unfortunately, Butterfield leaves traces of Whig tendencies that historians and historians of
science find inevitable when investigating individuals like Galileo, Descartes or Newton who
conquer over superstition with geometry.
What does provide The Origins of Modern Science its efficiency is the period examined
from 1300 to 1800. Whether the scientific revolution began either in the fourteenth or
seventeenth century1, the theory of impetus from the nominalist school, like Ockham and
Orseme, laid importance on a theory of motion from Aristotelian doctrine concerning falling
bodies. Without the theory set in motion, whether right or wrong, there wouldn’t be a “switch” in
the mind-set on Galileo’s dynamics of inertia from the swing pendulum to parabolic curve.
Butterfield clarifies the medieval sciences in terms that,
the modern world is in certain sense a continuation of the medieval one [;]…some
historians of science have been disposed seriously to qualify the traditional concept of the
“Renaissance” and to see, from the eleventh or twelfth century at least, a continuous
development of western thought2.
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This continuous trend from medieval to modern science approaches the transformation from
medieval sciences, similar if not different, to the modern sciences developed under Copernicus,
Kepler, Galileo, Descartes, and Newton.
Koyré’s From the Closed World to Infinite Universe is an expanded work on philosophy
were cosmology follows the concept of infinity. In his introduction, he writes the change of the
cosmos comes around the seventeenth century which is described as
bring forth the destruction of the Cosmos, that is, the disappearance…of the conception
of the world as a finite, closed and hierarchically ordered whole…and its replacement by
an indefinite and even infinite universe which is bound together by the identity of its
fundamental components and laws, and in which all these components are placed on the
same level of being3.
The philosophic component in the history of science deals this transforming model of a closed to
infinite world in Koyré’s investigations that speculates from a scientific to religious stance to the
individual’s perception in nature and environment.
Butterfield’s and Koyré’s canons initiate the philosophy in the history of science as one
sees a transformation of old to new science. From a traditional framework to innovative study,
one can see emerging works in the history of science discipline around the 50s to 80s in which
the sciences take a different stance than the philosophies of Kant or Whewell4. In connection to
Butterfield and Koyré, I find the philosophy in the history of science and its transformation in the
philosophies of Michel Foucault and Thomas Kuhn through epistemological changes.
Both philosopher and historian Foucault and Kuhn focus the epistemological changes of
the sciences, their transformations, when they investigate the modernity of science around the
10

sixteenth to seventeenth centuries. They share similar notions of epistemological changes with
epistemic breaks and paradigm shifts; however, their investigations take different approaches in
a biological and physical stance in science. In Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, he
states in his preface, “my decision to deal here exclusively with the latter [, physical,] was made
partly to increase this essay’s coherence and partly on grounds of present competence”5. He
could have written the biological inclusion but its context would not fit coherently as a whole
within the structure of scientific revolutions. Where Kuhn tackles the physical sciences, Foucault
demonstrates the historical transformation of ideas within a biological framework pertaining in
the realms of psychiatry and clinical medicine in his earlier works. For Foucault, he delves
further into the sciences and their “transformation” of another science.
I would see to it that Foucault’s and Kuhn’s philosophy in the history of science have
compatibile properties in epistemological changes when understanding the transformation of the
sciences. Though Foucault mentions slightly the physical sciences, his philosophy stems on a
“humanistic” picture of the sciences through techniques and knowledge investigated from his
earlier works to build a model of what the history of science constitutes.

Foucault’s medium
Ian Hacking, in his Historical Ontology, stipulated Foucault’s ideology of science, in
terms that can relate to Kuhn, on the matter that he calls “maturity” in the science. Like an
adolescence maturing into adult hood, organic maturity in the science is thrown into light of
progressive traits. Hacking’s view between the philosophies in the history of science with
Foucault and Kuhn, in terms of maturity, which Kuhn understands science as “nonobservable
11

and theoretical”6. Unlike Kuhn, Hacking models Foucault’s understanding of the sciences as
immature in his philosophy what Hacking calls as the “history of the present”. Foucault’s model
in the “history of the present” illustrates his articulated views on the theories of philosophy into a
practical form of technique. Due to the amount of content and little room to elaborate, I will
solely concentrate a representative debate on human nature that illustrates Foucault’s philosophy
in the history of science and where he lies in the “debate”.
I would agree on terms to Hacking stating in Foucault’s formation of his philosophy,
during the 1960s, which “phenomenology was detested and despised by figures such as LeviStrauss”7. Foucault may have aligned himself as a thinker of structuralism but, in the Foreword
to the English edition The Order of Things, he stated,
in France, certain half-witted ‘commentators’ persist in labeling me a “structuralist”. I
have been unable to get it into their tiny minds that I have used none of the methods,
concepts, or key terms that characterize structural analysis8.
In line of reasoning, there were some concepts and terms used but Foucault’s structuralism was
on a different level comparing to the anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss and existentialist JeanPaul Sartre. Where Foucault’s philosophy lies come from an archeology of knowledge/science
between the crux on Sartre’s freedom in existentialism and Levi-Strauss’s structural
anthropology. Examining slightly to what their philosophies exemplified can help further
elaborate Foucault’s defense on his “structuralism”.
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Sartre’s freedom
Sartre and Levi-Strauss did not have a face-to-face debate similar to Foucault and Noam
Chomsky’s debate in 1971 on human nature. The differences in Sartre and Levi-Strauss’
philosophies were pointed out by Levi-Strauss in his last chapter, The Savage Mind. To
understand what Levi-Strauss disregarded in Sartre’s system, I will elaborate the headings of
Sartre’s philosophy concerning the individual’s place within the world, environment, and history.
The concern is the individual’s place in history and what needs were to be fulfilled and
justified as beauteous in nature. Sartre’s philosophy is founded through his existentialism
concerning the maxim, like Kant’s categorical imperative, “existence precedes essence”. Kant’s
question in attribution to God’s position was Sartre’s solution through his existentialism away
from Kierkegaard’s and Jasper’s notion of essence and angst. To Sartre, an individual’s
existence, overcoming angst and despair, was liberated against humanity’s definition on what
makes a person a person. Sartre’s philosophy was to define the individual through one’s
liberation in everyday life-activity to thinking, working, talking and to the extent on living by
passing the inevitable despair and then to suicide. This marked one phase of Sartre’s philosophy
from his work in Being and Nothingness and would proceed to his next phase in modern French
philosophy.
The extent of Marxist thought influenced Sartre’s thinking in contribution of the
individual’s place in society when alienation settles in existentialism and what it meant for him.
Like Being and Nothingness, Sartre saw the Critique of Dialectical Reasoning as his superb
formation of French thought setting in the 1960s. The purpose was to combine Sartre’s notion of
13

freedom, the individual’s place, to Marxist interpretation to the Hegelian notion of history, the
nature of the dialectic; the dialectic as whole-part symbiosis or the thesis-antithesis-synthesis
matrix. Sartre defines the nature of history with the dialectics, as representatives, in totality and
totalization. To the former, Sartre defines totality as
as a being which, while radically distinct from the sum of its parts, is present in its
entirety, in one form or another, in each of these parts, and which relates to itself either
through its relation to one or more of its parts or through its relation to the relations
between all or some of them9.
The notion of totality is constructed within the being or individual itself. To the latter,
totalization adds the practico-inert self of doing which “relates the whole to itself through the
mediation of its parts”10. Totalization, to Sartre, is the major concern to the individual’s place in
history. Sartre views the problem that history, practically nature at some point, alienates the
individual which the individual disappears from historical categorization on practicality, groups
and communities11. Philosophically, the problem centralizes on consciousness.
From Butterfield’s construction of Whig history, history contains within its system of the
past viewed as present that links to the perceptions of the individual’s consciousness. For Sartre,
the totalization of history makes the individual, in-itself as a person, as a remnant past or fading
memory12. Sartre’s concern may seem too absurd or drastic but it serves a lining within the
debate on human nature in accordance to Levi-Strauss’ means.
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Levi-Strauss’ structural anthropology
Unlike Sartre’s concerns through the ends of philosophy, Levi-Strauss turns away French
philosophy and cross into the domains of anthropology. In Levi-Strauss’ The Savage Mind, he
argues against Sartre’s notion of the individual through the means by cultural context of the
barbaric individual. This notion imposes Sartre’ philosophy of man preceding “civilized” man in
Parisian culture versus the barbaric man in indigenous culture. The whole work is to equalize
human beings as companions sharing the globe as well sharing the same consciousness within
different cultures. Though geographic location, ecology, and hygiene are regionally different
through the temporal plane of the individual’s mind, Levi-Strauss argues in accordance with the
concept of kinship.
Like in Western culture stemming from Sophocles’ Oedipus Rex and finally into Freud’s
psychoanalysis, barbaric individuals show similar signs and system to take the prerogatives in
avoiding crimes of incest. There are totems to illustrate accuracy in the barbaric mindset
however Levi-Strauss disapproves the conventional classification within modern anthropology
and takes the comparison of the western mind set in the emerging fields of botany and zoology.
Levi-Strauss’ concept on the barbaric consciousness calls into order a civilized mind where
natural philosophy distinguishes magic from science. To Levi-Strauss, magic “postulates a
complete and all-embracing determinism” and science is, “based on a distinction between levels:
only some of these forms admit determinism; on others the same forms of determinism are not to
apply”13.
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The forms of knowledge imbedded on barbaric individuals are just the same as
individuals in civilized societies and are just different in comparison of methodologies that are
practice. Levi-Strauss further this idea into the types of individuals who practice like an engineer
does or what individuals practice as bricolage; the latter has no definitive equivalence in English
only the meaning in which compares to “do-it-yourselves” motto. Civilized individuals postulate
theorems or axioms like Euclid’s Elements in geometry and implements them in practicality
while barbaric individuals work in accordance to what nature designates itself interpretive to
fellow individuals; not a calling or shamanic practice in pursuits of knowledge but classification
to distinguish nature as an ordered or chaotic entity.
To Levi-Strauss, the bricolage individual “does not subordinate each of them [, things,] to
the availability of raw materials and tools conceived and procured for the purpose of things
project”14. This elimination of a project would have bothered Sartre’s philosophy concerning
totalities and totalization. In chapter eight, “History and Dialectic”, Levi-Strauss borrows
Sartre’s terminology to point the ridiculousness that Sartre himself allowed in his systematic
thought concerning the individual’s place in history. To Sartre, he uses the terms diachronic,
human-depth of existentialism in history, and synchrony, the ensemble of the present15, to
elaborate the totalization of history that can erase the individual’s place in history. For Sartre, the
dialectic “is not the culmination of history; it can only exist as the original movement of
totalisation”16. Synchrony is only brought through the praxis, the inherent practice-inert force,
which constitutes and reconstitutes itself in history; this in itself forms dialectic and analytic
reason.
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Along Sartre’s lines, Levi-Strauss found it hard to believe in what Sartre’s dialectic of
history produces the dialectic and analytic reason. Levi-Strauss states, “the work entitled
Critique de la raison dialectique is the result of the author's exercise of his own analytical
reason: he defines, distinguishes, classifies and opposes”17 as well to the difficulty presented that
both dialectic and analytic reason are “defined by mutually exclusive characteristics”18. LeviStrauss finds his contradiction with the matter to save Sartre’s method in combining
existentialism to Marxist-Hegelian nature of history. Levi-Strauss imposes his method into the
nature of the individual and history on human nature as sharing a structure. Levi-Strauss’
anthropological structuralism differs from Saussure’s structuralism, in signs and signifiers, and
Boas’ anthropology to solidify an ideology on human nature in constituting familiar structures
across the globe, culture and habit of fellow human beings. Levi-Strauss does not concentrate on
freedom and its liberation but the similitude of human beings sharing the same origins or
mythologies in civilized and barbaric societies. There is no liberation but a communal
understanding of humans sharing the same consciousness but different standards.

Foucault’s philosophy in the history of science
Like a political spectrum between Sartre and Levi-Strauss, the former represents the left
and the latter as the right: Sartre’s philosophy represents freedom while Levi-Strauss’ represents
equality. Obviously putting these perspectives into practice presents issues as impratical in
political context. Give for instance on the matters that political ideologies do not suit their
political parties for political ideologies vary on the spectrum pertaining to the individual’s or
community’s interest in practice.
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What Butterfield seeks is for the historian, through this political spectrum, as a medium
between liberation (Sartre) and equality (Levi-Strauss); the medium would be Foucault.
Foucault, I would like to believe, is the medium between the philosophies of Sartre and LeviStrauss on the nature of human beings and their place within history. Foucault’s philosophy in
the history of science distributes evenly yet perplexingly in writing between Sartre and LeviStrauss.
Foucault’s biological sciences
As stated before, Foucault’s view of the sciences rely on a biological or humanistic level
of analysis which created his system of philosophy. Convoluted on what Foucault argues in his
philosophy, his thoughts can easily be divided in two such categories: archeology and genealogy.
The former category tracks on his monographs from Madness & Civilization to The Order of
Things while the latter tracks Discipline & Punishment and The History of Sexuality. The
analysis of Foucault’s history of sciences imbeds itself with the history of madness, psychology,
psychiatry, clinical medicine and the human sciences.
Hacking points to Foucault’s immature science stemming from a focal point in his career
surrounding what Foucault concentrated on, particularly to Hacking’s historical ontology, the
three axes19: knowledge, power and ethics. For simplicity sake, Foucault’s philosophy of
knowledge, in relation to power and ethics, was first conceived through his investigations on
madness in the western world. In Madness & Civilization, Foucault investigated institutional
reforms, techniques and confinement centralizing the identified subjects as “insane”. Whether
one was indeed insane or not, there was no implication to physicians or neurologist in ethical
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standards but only the dire consequences in the medical train of thought which ebbed easily in
“practicing” treatment. Of course Foucault identified power in confinement and social
boundaries where so-called reason was attributed in society yet the underlying assumption settles
through the usage of knowledge.
In chapter six of Madness & Civilization, Foucault devotes philosophic analysis through
the ground work of medical treatment and techniques which at first became the standard
deviation to “good” practice but unfortunately became abused within the system or model as
time progresses from the initial standpoint. In curing madness, Foucault elaborates the moral
therapeutics as consolidation, immersion, purification and regulation of movement. In regulation
of movement, madness is identified as not only the obstruction of the bodily humors but as well
as “the irregular agitation of the spirits, the disordered movements of fibers and ideas”20. The
cure of madness in this technique is a simple regiment, prescribed from the physician, in
walking, running, horse riding or voyaging across plains, mountains, valleys, meadows, etc. The
purpose of this technique is liberation of the patient to exercise the will in regulation onto the
body within itself.
However, Foucault “twists” the perception to demonstrate in which one form of
knowledge can sustain that ideology then another ideology can “transcend” or replace it. The
physician’s surrounding of the asylum produces what is contributed as a mechanistic form in the
regulation of movement without the patient moving: the rotary machine. This mechanism was to
leave the patient in bed without every moving in which nature as a scenic portrayal was
“viewed” in an artificial screening where the bed rotates on its axis like a merry-go-round. There
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indeed was a transition for the better in one form but not to the individual’s sake; Sartre would
take consideration in the moral therapeutic of regulation. Foucault’s archeology phase began in
psychological evaluation of the patient continuing through The Birth of the Clinic.
A sequel in his history of science, Foucault’s extends psychiatric medical analysis to
clinical medical analysis between doctor and patient. The relation of doctor and patient
emphasizes the importance of communication grounding the archeological story which was
about “the creation of a self-constituting class of experts located within a new knowledge”21.
This new knowledge was the creation of the professional physician in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries centering the pathological anatomy of patients and the nosological scheme
on diagnosing pathogens. What constitutes these dramatic changes is termed by Foucault as the
“medical gaze” where the physician “plunges into the space that it has given itself to the task
traversing”22. By space, Foucault details the analysis of the physician’s mind which sees the
patient’s body spreading
before it, horizontally and vertically in graded depth, as it penetrates into the
body;…disease…is a set of forms and deformations, figures, and accidents and of
displaced, destroyed, or modified elements bound together in sequence according to a
geography that can be followed step by step. It is no longer a pathological species
inserting itself into the body wherever possible; it is the body itself that has become ill23.
What constitutes the medical gazes observes the patient as a set of organs rather than a being
suffering pathological disorders.
To Hacking, Foucault “does not aim at such a history of who said what and why, but a
story about the web of specific sentences that were uttered, and a theory… of what made it
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possible for those sentences to be uttered”24. Foucault’s genius with developing his philosophy in
the history of science can be extrapolated on the context of discourse with words, meanings and
“things” that detail the forms of knowledge from nature in context to man; this proceeds to his
next major work in The Order of Things.
The Order of Things
What Foucault followed in procedure through his philosophy comes from the thoughts
earlier illustrated in Sartre’s and Levi-Strauss’ philosophy in human nature and their place in
history. Foucault’s earlier work in archeology stratifies concepts and themes prevailing in his
philosophy concerned in the medical/biological form of knowledge and try to condense them
down into a reliable form in which the sciences form into the human sciences. What gave
Foucault a fascination into the philosophical and historical interests was the fact that “he was
adept at reorganizing past events in order to rethink the past”25. Sustainable forms of knowledge
to Foucault were reliable to those who can utilize them in everyday activity from
communication, work and basic living.
Foucault’s philosophy in the history of science traces epistemological breaks what he
refers to the classical age of knowledge from the sixteenth to eighteen centuries that articulate
the sciences emerging in biology, economics and linguistics. Foucault’s concept in life, labor and
language are formed from these sciences after the nineteenth century reconstituting the
knowledge that can perplex the historians of science on how these sciences transformed through
history. The inquiry expounded is not easily at first grasped due to the content in which Hacking
states, “these sciences have objects that don’t correspond with or map onto their predecessors of
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natural history, the theory of wealth, or general grammar”26. In order to preserve the transitional
elements in the sciences, there must be predecessors in which knowledge had a limitation to what
can be stated in matters relating to its specialized form.
Foucault analyzes biology, economics and linguistic to form bridges but as well gaps
from the earlier concepts of natural history, analysis of wealth and general grammar. Though
complex, Foucault maps these occurrences within the classical domain which provides a visual
representation27 to his readers on what occurred in that specific point in history. The
representation occurs through two diagrams one in seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and the
other in the nineteenth century. The former illustrates the four corners situating the elements of
articulation, attribution, designation and derivation into a geometric plane, supposing Euclidean
projection, onto two activities networking out into continuity of beings and representability of
beings. What occurs in the nineteenth century model of knowledge keeps the same structure
however a spastic influx occurs where continuity and representation disappears and what
emerges through its inverses are the philosophical and epistemological fields. Fields that once
never existed now existed due to a transition from the empty gaps from the previous model of the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. What results into the nineteenth century is an assumption
of philosophy in formalization and interpretation versus epistemology as actual forms.
This is not to say that philosophy is useless rather it is a self-reflection on itself which
once systematize can reconfigure itself without causal explanation through nature. To picture
Foucault’s epistemic breaks is to imagine a continuous series on broken lines in which the whole
model represents non-continuity. These gaps between broken lines and their aberrations can be
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interpreted through the medium of the individual or the individual’s place in history in which the
notion of power disrupts but as well creates new knowledge; however, the notion of power is not
significantly identified as human interactions. To Foucault, history may have no place in the
human sciences in which “it may well be that it maintains with them all a relation that is strange,
undefined, ineffaceable, and more fundamental than any relation of adjacency in a common
space would be”28. History first occurred in human memory in primitive times before the
creation of the human sciences yet it is the human sciences of anthropology, sociology, and
psychology that traverse the web of knowledge giving a purpose. There is inference that history
did not need human sciences but inversely the human sciences needed history.
The so-called nature of history in relation back to Sartre’s conception relies solely on the
individual’s place in history however Foucault thinks otherwise. In Foucault’s endless
transformations, or immature sciences, the individual does have a place in Sartre’s model
however Foucault emphasis of the individual can be summed up as,
Man did not exist – anymore than the potency of life, the fecundity of labour, or the
historical density of language. He is a recent creature, which the demiurge of knowledge
fabricated with its own hands less than two hundred years ago29.
Such a pronouncement incurs Nietzsche’s cry in “God is dead” and becomes a prodigy to
Foucault crying “Man is dead”. Obviously the two are highly different in humans and gods but
what occurs to the mind of Foucault is the interrelated model of human beings within the context
of history.
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This model installed in his philosophy can be analyzed in the context that through the
transformation of the sciences are transitory to the individual’s place where knowledge is
constantly created just as human beings. There is a slight deviation in which Hacking points out
with the correlation between individuals and the totality of knowledge through a question: What
are the relations between power and knowledge?30 Hacking provides two bad answers, (1)
knowledge is instrumental to gain ends of power and (2) a new body of knowledge brings new
institutions in power. Why they were considered bad gave two contradictions in the ideologies
themselves like Russell’s paradox in sets and classes: “(1) a ruling class generates an ideology
that suits its own interests; and (2) a new ideology, with new values, creates a niche for a new
ruling class”31. Hence we find, in political and scientific terminologies, a revolution.
What Hacking extends to Foucault’s immature science is the notion which the sciences
are constantly transforming but has no structure at first and if so, like the origins of the universe,
there is no focal point of origin. Foucault’s philosophy in the history of sciences is an eternal
recurrence in which the human sciences “captures” the knowledge of nature and boxes in a
corporal or material being in which continuity exists in “that” temporal plane versus an idealized
form. It is because of this idealized form does Foucault structure a geometrical plane of
knowledge as well as the planes intersecting in formation. To Foucault, the modern episteme,
form of knowledge, begins in the first plane of mathematization to the empirical sciences, then
converse to the second plane of the human sciences. With Foucault,
the first two dimensions together define a common plane: that which can appear,
according to the direction in which one traverses it, as a field of application of
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mathematics to these empirical sciences, or as a domain of the mathematicizable [, or
geometrization,] in linguistics, biology and economics32.
Once these two planes are solely combined then can the third geometrical plane of knowledge
intercedes with philosophical reflection. When philosophical reflection institutes itself in this
geometrical plane of knowledge can one then say that “those regional ontologies which attempt
to define what life, labour, and language are in their own being” and “the mathematical
disciplines combine to define another common plane: that of the formalization of thought”33.
This now completes a model that is founded by mathematical-physical spaces that when
converged through geometric planes transcends to the human sciences in connection to
geometrical reasoning or philosophical reflection.
Foucault’s philosophy in the history of science is at the pivotal point to say in
conjunction to Kuhn’s philosophy in the history of science in which compatibility is at hand.
Though they are two different in context of their sciences it is rather a necessity to impose the
obligation which the two philosophers have more in common in what method of philosophy
describes “these” sciences.

Kuhn’s philosophy in the history of science
Though Hacking does not find compatibility in their sciences, I would like to view the
contrary that there can be something in their philosophies. Previously described, what makes
them incompatible, according to Hacking, demonstrates the accuracy on the maturity level
exemplified through their philosophical systems: Foucault’s science is immature while Kuhn’s
science is mature. For Foucault, The Order of Things is “philosophical because it portrays a
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theory of knowledge, in both theoretical and practical terms” while Kuhn’s The Structure of
Scientific Revolutions “tended to be nonobservable and theoretical”34.
Kuhn’s philosophy opposes Foucault’s in non-observation which the physical sciences
have taken yet there is the second half on doing science through experimentation or its
practicality; this maintains his view with the philosophy of the history of science. Kuhn’s notion
on the sciences is based on the scientific revolution in which he dealt with earlier in his
Copernican Revolution. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions examines not one particular
science that Copernicus innovated but a series of revolutions with a set of disciplines, scientists
and “rules” that play in dealing the stature of what he calls “normal” science. On the nature of
“normal science”, there is the overall structure in which it starts and “end”:
“Normal” science is the rule, and this comes down to the quiet and successive resolution
of remaining puzzles after the revolution has led to the establishment of a fresh
“paradigm” – a set of principles and modus operandi accepted as valid, for the time
being, by the community of scientists organized around the paradigm35.
Cataclysmically, what fail in his philosophy in the history of science is his notions on paradigms
and their shifts.
Paradigms and paradigm shifts
In the introductory essay to the fiftieth anniversary edition, Hacking points that Kuhn
himself and the popular usage misappropriated the meaning to an entirely different concept of
paradigms in them. Before Kuhn’s usage, ancient antiquity verbalized paradigms as deductive or
analogical36. Hacking illustrates Aristotle’s notion in the situation with Athens and Sparta:
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“Should Athens go to war with its neighbor Thebes? No. It was evil of Thebes to make war on its
neighbor Phocis. Any Athenian audience would agree; [hence] it is a paradigm”37. Paradigms
meant in this context as contradictory meanings which form an argumentative substance that
points to one who should not do what one proposes in its significance; ancient politicians and
statesmen have used paradigms to further their context that does not control the populace by
mere rhetorical skills but the shift in meaning that can either take a good or bad turn.
In relation to Kuhn, he does not take paradigms as a set of self-evident rules when
applying them to practice science. To Kuhn, practical science delineates away from theoretical or
non-observable science in his notion of normal science. Normal science is divided by two
components in a scientific community38: the previous competing models and the problems to be
rectified within the community. Normal science is a way of doing science within the norm and
its social contexts pertaining to those who practice science or know about them. To Kuhn, these
scientific models and their problems are like players trying to solve a puzzle: there is an a priori
of the model but the individual has to piece it together to make the picture work out to their
advantage. In this case, the advantage relies solely on the scientist in their particular community
or specialization.
Through training and rigorous application can the scientist figure or reconfigure past
models in conjunction to “new” models to explain their paradigm shifts. What Kuhn uses as
these paradigm shifts can be explained like “rules” in language or psychological association. To
the former, the scientist reconfigures inherently on the “rules” of doing science which
systematizes, like Foucault’s order, an order pertaining to these paradigms that Kuhn associates
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with Wittgenstein’s usage on words. Kuhn examines Wittgenstein’s philosophy on words and
their associations to meaning through ostentation like: what applies to “terms like ‘chair’, or
‘leaf’, or ‘game’ unequivocally and without provoking argument”? 39 In other words, what gives
meaning by association? Kuhn answers that “we must…grasp some set of attributions that all
games and that only games have in common”40. There must be correspondence on what must be
spoken to retain meaning behind something as real as the sun is the center of our solar system,
2+2=4, or the earth is spherical in shape through a vacuum of empty space. Kuhn points, in
Wittgenstein’s idea, that there are no “set of characteristics” rather one sees a “family
resemblance”41; there are such resemblances that overlap one another on what primarily
constituted.
The second sets on psychological terms used from the first used in rules on communal or
professional aspects to the scientist; this becomes Kuhn’s gestalt switch theory on doing science.
Kuhn utilized the weltanschauung philosophy concerning the individual’s place in the world
while perceiving certain objects in nature. In normal science,
the transition from a paradigm in crisis to a new one from which a new tradition of
normal science can emerge is far from a cumulate process…; During the transition period
there will be a large but never complete overlap between problems that can be solved by
the old and by the new paradigm42.
Unlike Foucault’s broken lines, there are no gaps but impositions of gaps during this transitional
phase from old to new models of paradigms.
This shift from the scientist or anthropological view now becomes Kuhn’s gestalt switch
when he agreed to Butterfield’s thought that reorientation is like “picking up the other end of the
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stick” and “handling the same bundle of data as before, but placing them in a new system of
relation with one another by giving them a different framework”43. Kuhn attributes this different
framework to the scientist practicing normal science as “a change in visual gestalt: the marks on
paper that were first seen as a bird are now seen as an antelope, or vice versa. That parallel can
be misleading. Scientist do not see something as something else; instead, they simply see it”44.
Scientist simply sees and observes to what nature has provided in accordance pre-established to
the individual and its place in history. The gestalt switch of a bird to antelope or duck to rabbit,
exemplifies a significant transition of the psychological profile of the scientist investigating
nature as biological or sociological forces occurring.
Kuhn’s paradigms point to two divergences from the rules of language and gestalt switch
in the sciences as well as the practicality within the scientific community and possibly the global
community. With Kuhn, there are the natural and social sciences that delineate from the initial
purpose on what create these scientific revolutions and there structures. Kuhn’s normal science
through paradigms cross examines in itself within and without these sciences that produces these
“revolutions”. In practicality of rules in the sciences, “paradigms could determine normal science
without the intervention of discoverable rules”45 [my italics]; this in thought turns back onto to
the scientist and further in which the human sciences, with complex rules and direction,
infiltrates the natural sciences.
How these non-interventions of discoverable rules apply can only be met when Kuhn
states, “one is at liberty to suppose that somewhere along the way the scientist has intuitively
abstracted rules of the game himself”46. This possible line of reasoning in paradigms and the
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sciences echoes a shadowing of the individual and one’s place in history within Foucault’s
philosophy in the history of science.

The Foucault-Kuhn shift
Kuhn’s evaluations on the sciences and their revolutions relies on the idea of paradigms
that fortify within the system that automatically fills the gaps where Foucault’s immature science
would never resolve rather transform an endless cycle of knowledge. The complexity hidden
with Kuhn’s paradigm shifts involve the individual and their place in history where the science
community retains the individual scale and the paradigm shifts them as nature within itself in
history. The complexity implies that “normal science is a single monolithic and unified
enterprise” in that solely history determines the sciences as one-sided and, to some extent of the
historian, as Whig in nature. Conclusively, Kuhn does not use a Whig approach like Butterfield’s
determination against Whig history in The Origins of Modern Science.
What makes Foucault and Kuhn different becomes apparent like the two-faced Janus and
the gestalt switch model the weltanschauung through juxtaposing philosophy in the history of
science. One never matures yet becomes continuous while the other mature yet could break to an
entirely different model. In Hacking’s conclusive examination of the two philosophers, there are
indeed incompatible forces that drive a wedge between the two and their sciences. However, one
system of thought could enhance the epistemic breaks by filling the gaps of Kuhn’s paradigm
shifts as a line of continuity in the history of science. Transformation, a change of conceptual
models that configures geometrical knowledge, spreads in history and philosophy into the
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mathematical-physical realm that moves the cosmos from a closed world to infinite universe
with Copernicus’ to Newton’s cosmos.
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CHAPTER THREE: COPERNICUS’ INNOVATION
What I call the Foucault-Kuhn shift presents the philosophy in the history of science as a
model to illustrate a philosophic concept on transformation. The historical and philosophical
concept in this paper is to show an interdisciplinary approach from what I would like to
transition from the Foucault’s and Kuhn’s philosophic concept to the historic content. Their
epistemological changes occurs as a result on a transformation from consciousness and
environment that Owen Barfield, in his Saving the Appearances, approaches the history of
science that the “culmination in a system of thought only interests itself in phenomena to the
extent that they can be grasped as independent of consciousness”1 [my italics]. Nature and its
ideas are grasped by independent variables but some of these ideas are inter-related, historically
and philosophically speaking, with one another that forms Koyré’s philosophic outlook in the
transforming cosmos.
The big picture in investigating the history of science from Copernicus to Newton is the
model pertaining to cosmology affecting instrumental means by astronomy, mathematics, and
physics. According to Bertrand Russell’s A History of Western Philosophy, he identifies four
prominent scientists2 who emerged the new picture of modern science and its cosmology from
the old picture with Nicholas Copernicus, Johannes Kepler, Galileo Galilei and Isaac Newton.
Though I cannot cover all four, two are the main stage while the other two are supporters. The
emergence of this cosmological model from a closed world to infinite universe allows a
transformation in which all disciplines of science connect each other during this period of
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scientific advancement. What makes them intriguing comes with Copernicus’ innovation and
Newton’s synthesis of the cosmos.

The scientific revolution
In the second edition of The Critique of Pure Reason, Immanuel Kant styles his
transcendental philosophy as a “revolution” in the sciences concerning the matter in which
Copernicus took it upon himself. Kant’s philosophy was in intuition that would resemble
Copernicus’ revolution in the sciences; however, Copernicus “assumed that the entire celestial
host revolves around the observer, [and] tried to see if he might not have greater success if he
made the observer revolve and left the stars at rest”3. Kant’s initial emphasis of Copernicus
begins the awareness on historians of science4 that something did occur through historic
evaluations in the scientific revolution from Copernicus’ to Newton’s time.
The significance that came from their time transitioned into the sciences of Einstein,
Bohr, Schrodinger, Planck and Heisenberg which builds a continuous foundation from antiquity
to modernity. I start with Copernicus’ revolution not a confusion of series to other sciences rather
a “plurality…[which] offers an ideal opportunity to discover how and with what effects the
concepts of many different fields are woven into a single fabric of thought”5. In Kuhn’s
Copernican Revolution, Copernicus’ revolutionary text was a matter that “the book gave rise to a
revolution that it had scarcely enunciated. It is a revolution-making rather than a revolutionary
text”6. The text in itself was bent on ‘saving the phenomena’ through reforming Ptolemy’s
Almagest in Kuhn’s emphasis that the “Ptolemaic planetary theory had turned into a ‘monster’”7.
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Before Copernicus’ cannon, there constitute transformative elements that appear or
influence the transformation of cosmology in Copernicus particularly switching from a geocentric to heliocentric model. Such elements to be investigated are efficient to give a transitional
picture into Copernicus’ innovation following the ideas coming out of occult science, humanism,
scholasticism and cosmology.
Occult science
Edward Rosen raised the question in his article “Was Copernicus a hermeticist?” which
divides Copernicus’ innovation into two phases: “the first phase consisting of an animistic
universe operated by magic, the second phase of a mathematical universe operated by
mechanic”8. This line of inquiry can be such stated in the matters that Copernicus’ influence may
have been derived through the hermetic tradition in which he states in chapter 10 of De
revolutionibus, introduction,
…the middle of everything is the sun. For in this most beautiful temple, who would place
this lamp in another or better position than that from which it can light up the whole thing
at the same time? For, the sun is not inappropriately called by some people the lantern of
the universe, its mind by others, and its ruler by still others. [Hermes] the Thrice Greatest
labels it a visible god, and Sophocles' Electra, the all-seeing9.
Where did this innovation of a sun-centered universe come from? In Alexandrian times,
Aristarchus of Samos first postulated the sun-centered universe however mathematical
explanation fell to deaf ears. Copernicus cites, “I found in Cicero that Hicetas supposed the earth
to move. Later I also discovered in Plutarch that certain others were of this opinion”10. There was
also of mention of Pythagoras and his pupil Philolaus into the nature of the cosmos and its
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harmonious order. This train of thought comes from the hermetic tradition that significantly
influenced, in some way, the transformation of modern science.
This line of questioning first arose through Francis Yates’ Giordano Bruno and the
Hermetic Tradition; most intrinsic around Copernicus’ times. The hermetic tradition comes from
a corpus account written by the designated yet fictional figure named Hermes Trismegistus; the
former named after Hermes, the Greek god of delivery, and the latter named Thoth, “the scribe
of the gods and the divinity of wisdom”11. The hermetic tradition came into focus that occurred
in year before Christ but later historians have shown that the hermetic corpus came after Christ in
the fourth century12.
In the sixteenth century, what scholasticism called natural philosophy had an extended
meaning other than theology in which alchemy, astrology, magic and cabalism where imbedded
in the studies. Magic was highly sensitive to persecution if used incorrectly but designated as a
private practice which only a few knew of its hidden secrets, hence “occult”. Heinrich Cornelius
Agrippa, a pupil of Johannes Trithemius, composed an account of magic in his youth entitled
Three Books Concerning Occult Philosophy. To his readers, he addresses the purpose on
elucidating the notion of magic against the devilish usage which “a magician doth not amongst
leaned men signifie a sorcerer, or one that is superstitious or [devilish]; but a wise man, a priest
[and] a prophet”13. What is highly sensitive undergoes the matter to take the distinction between
what he considers good magic versus evil. The evil classified the practices of charlatans who
create the “philosopher’s stone” in healing all disease with the thought to transmute any object to
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gold and matters of conjuring evil spirits, necromancy, to harm others; the good relates to natural
philosophy, or some sense science.
Through the hermetic tradition, Yates investigates leading influences of magic that later
transferred into Bruno’s thought process on memory, theology and magic. She traces his
precursors from Pico, Ficino, Pseudo-Dionysius and Agrippa that demonstrates the Renaissance
tradition of its sciences leading into the modernization of the sciences. Yates describes the
survey of Agrippa that rely magic in the world through three realms14: natural, celestial and
ceremonial magic. She states that all three divisions “correspond to the divisions of philosophy
into physics, mathematics and theology. Magic alone includes all three”15. Mathematics, in a
way, resembles magic from a tradition of Pythagoras that accumulates the strata of nature
through mathematical means in which gives harmony to the universe. Yates points out, during
Agrippa’s time, the marvelous constructions of ancient works like columns and pyramids
through the sciences of arithmetic, music, geometry, optics, astronomy and mechanics16.
Through these marvelous inventions and constructions to human civilization, can one say
that Copernicus’ genius merited directly from the hermetic tradition? According to Yates and
Rosen, they answer to the negative. To Rosen, Copernicus’ innovation retained “no hermeticcabalist tradition was dominant in his mind. It was the opposition of Aristotelians and
theologians that he feared”17. Copernicus had no revolutionary means to overthrow the
geocentric view of the earth or enrage the theologians protecting Aristotelian physics in alliance
with Catholic doctrine. What became controversy was Bruno’s incitement of Copernican
doctrine in relation that ties to the hermetic mind in which Yates argues that Bruno was “taking
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the Copernican sun as a portent in the sky of the imminent return”18. Copernicus is seen more a
mathematican’s role rather than the hermetic in pre-dating modern science. Copernicus chose
simply the heliocentric model that harmonizes the world’s system in relation to man in which
humanism was a leading factor in this transformation of modern science.
Humanism
When Copernicus cited Cicero and Plutarch inversely they cited the Greeks astronomers
and mathematicians, there was an authority of Greco-Roman literature which came into tradition
to the Europeans around the Renaissance, circa fifteenth century. The authority of the Greeks and
Romans was to “return” back into a golden age, before Europe’s bubonic plague, leading to its
recovery simultaneously as Constantinople fell to the Turks in 1453. Marie Boas, in The
Scientific Renaissance, stated that “one of the strangely persistent myth of history is that the
humanist study of Greek works began with the arrival in Italy in 1453 of learned refugees from
Constantinople…laden with rare manuscripts”19. There is some accuracy to her statement on
translation and transmission of Greek texts but it will show later that there were phases of
transmission that came in Europe dating back to medieval times. The purpose is to evaluate the
idea of humanism and what it stands for.
George Sarton was influenced20 by this ideology of the Renaissance humanism in which
he tried to combine with the emerging field in the history of science. With that in mind, what is
humanism and what did it mean in Copernicus’ time? Yates illustrates two definitive definitions
to what constitutes humanism: Latin humanism and Pico’s humanism. The former runs as the
initial point in which Cicero’s letters were re-discovered by Petrarch. The rediscovery of the
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Roman politician “reached a stage of sophistication before the next great experience of the
Renaissance”21 than the Greek texts of Constantinople. After the Crusades and bubonic plague,
Europe needed to re-establish Roman identity throughout Italy, Petrarch’s domain, in which
Cicero became the model of a “gentleman” figure to Europeans. Humanism was a response into
recreating Cicero’s ideal of a “republic”, predominately in Italy, and the literary and historical
studies which Cicero wrote to produce the elegant language of Latin22; hence the “humanist”
tradition in Latin.
The latter version of humanism stems from Pico’s mixture of cabalism and magic in the
natural world surrounding the individual. Pico’s version of humanism, in The Oration and
Dignity of Man, relies that the individual is the center of the universe and is “the intermediary
between creatures, which he is familiar of the gods above him as he is lord of the things beneath
him”23. His reasoning came from cabalistic interpretation of nature that used the sacred language
of the Hebrews rather than the ancestors of the Romans. Pico’s humanism co-inflicted to
Petrarch’s and Erasmus’ humanism which creates the tradition of humanism of Christian Europe
that shadows the universe in an orderly fashion of the individual and one’s place in history.
The idea of order in both a magic-religious and political-religious tradition can be
explained in psychological terms on why humanist tradition went against itself through the
magical qualities. In psychological terms, Kuhn dates the mystical meaning of man’s place in the
universe as a two-centered universe to the primitive mind. The two centered universe is the
micro and macro cosmic orders that re-align cosmology as a theater in which the stage surrounds
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man’s daily activities and those activities by the Gods24. In relation to astronomy and cosmology,
he states,
by explaining the physical relationship between man’s habitat and the rest of nature, they
integrate the universe for man and make him feel at home in it. Man does not exist for
long without inventing a cosmology because a cosmology can provide him a world-view
which permeates and gives meaning to his action, practical and spiritual25.
In Humanism, the author of the text, spiritual or mathematical, was to confirm back to man’s
place “without scribal errors and the restoration of doubtful passage”26. This line of confirmation
to the humanist holds similar yet different boundaries concerning the scholastic tradition.
Scholasticism
Scholasticism was the practical boundaries to theologians on interpretation of God’s
agency and the world in which God created. Stated before, Scholastics had three trends, with the
translations, that created the antagonism of Aristotelian authority. The transition27 of knowledge
starts from Boethius’ and Macrobius’ translations of Greek and Roman texts; the high Middle
Ages admitting Arabic commentators and translations of Aristotle; finally, there are the
translations re-interpreting and organizing the Greek authorities of Archimedes’ mechanics,
Galen’s anatomy and Ptolemy’s mathematics in the Renaissance.
Forming Copernicus’ and Newton’s background of late Scholasticism28, there were a
change of institutional standards through the education on monasteries. After the Byzantine
emperor Justinian closed the doors of Plato’s academy, there ended the “pagan” teaching to
Christians; however, the transmission of knowledge like wealth never ends. Before the formation
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of the universities in the high middles, monasteries structured the teachings of Christ and the
natural world that human beings inhabited. An exemplar found in monasteries was the teachings
and experiences of St. Anthony and his temptations from the devil in which he received salvation
living the life of a hermit. The purpose was to rejuvenate a new order of saintly hood which
continued with St. Benedict’s firm rule of monastic life and the retrieval of lost information
before the Roman Empire broke away from the barbarian invasion.
Russell demonstrates the matter that “in later centuries, monks served many purposes:
they were skilled agriculturists, and some of them kept alive or revived learning”29. However, in
the beginning, “most monks did not work, never read anything except what religion prescribed,
and conceived virtue in an entirely negative manner, as abstention from sin, especially the sins of
the flesh”30. In some way was Petrarch right in describing those times as the “dark” ages yet
there had to be some light in that darkness to transpire. During the Crusades, a defense of
Catholic faith or identity leads the revival of western learning but with the support of their
enemies. Regardless of war, there are constant cycles of trades that not only dealt in monetary
but knowledge factors in crisis.
What created Scholasticism were, ironically, the three faiths that went against spiritual
doctrine: Judaism, Christianity and Islam. Each faith represented were the philosophers
Maimonides, Thomas Aquinas and Averroes in which tried to combine Aristotelian philosophy,
reason, into the sacred scripture, faith. Averroes strenuously built the works, Maimonides found
compatibility of such harmony on religion and philosophy, and Aquinas succeeded after the
tribulations formed around the Parisian decree of 1277 which discredited Averroes influence and

41

the pagan Aristotle. Around the late Middle Ages, Aquinas system of faith and philosophy
helped Dante support the Thomistic picture through his adventures in The Divine Comedy.
Dante’s illustrated how close the celestial and “deadly” realms closed into man’s material view
in the intermediary planes that separates them. The individual is composed within one’s realm as
material and spiritual like Aristotle’s philosophy. On the matter of the individual’s place, Kuhn,
describes Dante’s allegory that,
Man lives in squalor and uncertainty, and he is very close to hell. But his central location
is strategic, for he is everywhere under the eye of God. Both man’s double nature and his
intermediate position enforce the choice from which the drama of Christianity is
compounded. He may follow his corporeal, earthly nature down to its natural place at the
corrupt center, or he may follow his soul upward through the successively more spiritual
spheres until he reaches God31.
The Scholastic picture of theology painted the universe as synchronic from AristotelianPtolemaic universe to matters of faith and philosophy where the individual resides in a
geocentric model of the world instead of questioning matter of ‘appearances’.

Cosmology in Copernicus
In the forward to Copernicus’ De revolutionibus orbium coelestium, Osiander writes the
following on behalf of Copernicus to illustrate his “hypothesis” concerning the heavens in due
not to contradict sacred scripture. Osiander furthers in his opinion when he states the matter on
the astronomer’s part:
For it is the duty of an astronomer to compose the history of the celestial motions through
careful and expert study. Then he must conceive and devise the causes of these motions
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or hypotheses about them. Since he cannot in any way attain to the true causes, he will
adopt whatever suppositions enable the motions to be computed correctly from the
principles of geometry for the future as well as for the past32.
Osiander concludes that Copernicus only held the heliocentric system of the universe as a
hypothesis least “he accept as the truth ideas conceived for another purpose, and depart from this
study a greater fool than when he entered it”33. The problem that would later fall in line in
Copernican doctrine continued a tradition in the study of cosmology with “saving the
appearances/phenomena”.
In Plato’s Timaeus and Aristotle’s De caelo, both philosophers painted an opposing
theory and practice to the physicist/astronomer concerning the nature of the two-sphere universe
or heavens. C.S. Lewis regards this situation when concerning the sciences from antiquity in
conformity to modernity that “a scientific theory must ‘save’ or ‘preserve’ the appearances, the
phenomena…”34. What concerns the cosmos could be for example,
your phenomena are luminous points in the night sky which exhibit such and such
movements in relation to one another and in relation to an observer at a particular point,
or various chosen points, on the surface of the earth35.
By “your phenomena”, there resides on the traditional cosmos in which the individual resides in
the universe where the earth is the center of all creation in relation to individual faith concerning
the importance. Opposite to physical phenomena, “your astronomical theory will be a supposal
such that, if it were true, the apparent motions from the point or points of observation would be
those you have actually observed. The theory will then have ‘got in’ or ‘saved’ the
appearances”36. Lewis’ contemporary, Barfield, pointed that Plato made distinction to knowledge
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of the heavenly universe in which geometry, the individual’s instrument, is the bastard between
pure-intelligence and sense knowledge37. The astronomical level intermingles with observation,
calculation of celestial objects and the divine truth in all the cosmos38 which early humanity have
relied through the millennia in religious ceremonies, navigation and speculation.
Copernicus worked within an ancient/medieval tradition of the cosmos that defined the
earth as the center of all virtues and actions in which the individuals resided within God’s
creation of the universe. Such philosophers like Plato, Aristotle, Simplicus, Pseudo-Dionysius
and St. Thomas Aquinas built the frame or model of the cosmos where the planets are align in
accordance from the furthest heavens, fixed stars, Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, the Sun, Venus,
Mercury, and the moon, to earth. The celestial sphere are aligned in regards to the common
individuals that views the sun rising from the east and setting in the west. Those who perturb
further can unveil the “secrets” of the universe in which such occurrences happens to the Earth’s
seasons, equinoxes, lunar and solar eclipses, and the orbits of Mercury and Venus.
Astronomical inquiries do observes a physical phenomenon in place as well as
mathematical calculations observant to the viewer. The earlier mathematicians Philolaus,
Eudoxus, Hipparchus, and Apollonius, structured the heaven through mathematical formulas that
operated the mechanics in homocentric circles, epicycles, deferent and eccentrics. Like Newton,
Ptolemy synthesized through his Mathematical Syntax, or Almagest, the operative functions of
the planets in appearances and mathematical precisions. The “saving appearances” issued
accumulated Ptolemaic astronomy when Ptolemy explained the retrograde motion of planets like
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Mars in which regression is apparent to the observer and implement a rigorous model of
epicycles that later turned into a “monster” venture where the Cosmos is in discord.
One section of Foucault’s The Order of Things views the world Copernicus’ time from
the notion of resemblance in four axes: convention, emulation, analogy and sympathy versus
antipathy. The forces that bind the world also bind the axis in which,
the whole volume of the world, all the adjacencies of 'convenience', all the echoes of
emulation, all the linkages of analogy, are supported, maintained, and doubled by this
space governed by sympathy and antipathy, which are ceaselessly drawing things
together and holding them apart39.
The sixteenth century knowledge, or episteme, of Copernicus was at an ends and what came after
would transform into a “new” area of discipline and knowledge gathering from the gaps from the
previous generation. However said, Copernicus’ innovation was not an ends to means rather a
means to an end on a notorious debate in cosmology, mathematics, theology and physical
sciences.
De revolutionibus
Copernicus model of heliocentricity was discussed prior to the compilation on De
revolutionibus in a small treaty passed to his peers written in the Commentariolus in which he
states the significance of the heavens and their misrepresentation that,
I have often considered whether there could perhaps be found a more reasonable
arrangement of circles, from which every apparent inequality would be derived and in
which everything would move uniformly about its proper center, as a rule of absolute
motion requires40.
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After identifying the problem, Copernicus lists six assumptions on proposing a heliocentric
model in replacement of Ptolemy’s geocentric model. Three of the seven listed41, to give a sense
on what he thought, Copernicus examines that (1) there is no one center of all of the celestial
circles or spheres; (2) The center of the earth is not the center of the universe, but only of gravity
and of the lunar sphere; and (3) All the spheres (planets) revolve about the sun as their midpoint,
and therefore the sun is the center of the universe. Copernicus treated these assumptions as
axioms that Euclid authorized in his Elements and wouldn’t consider the plausibility of selfevident truths in nature which supposes what Osiander considers them merely hypothesis;
however, Copernicus structured the heavens based on these axioms to calculate the mathematical
precisions concerning epicycles and eccentrics.
Though Copernicus’ innovation came into context with a heliocentric model, he
calculated the heavens through geometric and trigonometric methods on epicycles and eccentric.
Much of Copernicus’ mathematics relies on Ptolemaic methods in which “it [De revolutionibus]
was mathematical planetary astronomy, not cosmology or philosophy, that Copernicus found
monstrous, and it was the reform of mathematical astronomy that alone compelled him to move
the earth”42. Accordingly Copernicus’ continued an improved tradition of Ptolemaic mathematics
which leads to his creative accounts of heliocentricity. The fabrications of his perfectly circulated
spheres were reasons, like his ancient Greek predecessors, based on Earth’s position. Copernicus,
in chapter one, exclaims the spherical universe
…is spherical. The reason is either that, of all forms, the sphere is the most perfect,
needing no joint and being a complete whole, which can be neither increased nor
diminished; or that it is the most capacious of figures, best suited to enclose and retain all
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things; or even that all the separate parts of the universe, I mean the sun, moon, planets
and stars, are seen to be of this shape; or that wholes strive to be circumscribed by this
boundary, as is apparent in drops of water and other fluid bodies when they seek to be
self-contained43.
In relation to bodies of water, Copernicus included the pre-supposition of Earth being spherical.
Through determination of the physical universe Copernicus conclude the relation of macro-micro
perspective harmoniously mathematical to the observer.
His model is such that “the major irregularities of the planetary motions are only
apparent”44. The appearances in this case relies the problems of retrograde motion which
Copernicus task is to not only “save the appearances” but as well reduced the intricate system
built up through numerous mathematical calculation after Ptolemy. The view that Copernicus
reduced “the total number or circles (deferents and epicycles) to thirty-four instead of the
seventy-seven required in the geocentric theory”45 is highly probable when pointed out by
Koestler. In The Sleepwalkers, Koestler argued that the Commentary had less than forty
(approximately 34) compared46 to Ptolemy’s original calculation and that Copernicus in fact had
48. Koestler stated that “contrary to popular and even academic belief, Copernicus did not reduce
the number of circles, but increased them”47. Why was this mistaken? He pointed that
mathematicians and astronomers did not take Copernicus work seriously even Galileo did not
read it, yet used Copernican doctrine to justify his theory on tides and the making of Copernican
doctrine.
Not only innovations began accurate as seen by Copernicus model of the universe. He
worked within a closed circuit of the ancient world where astronomers, mathematicians and
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physicists have not seen or believed the physical ultimate truth rather a metaphysical one.
Copernicus still believed an invisible geocentric model of mathematical hypothesis and inserted
it with a heliocentric approach. With reason, is the probable cause to increase the epicycles from
40 to 48 which Koestler argued Copernicus had to compensate the abolition of equants,
imaginary fluctuations, the constant angle of Earth’s axis and the rectilinear oscillations48.
Copernicus not only stumble mathematical precision but as well physical theories of heavenly
motions concerning stellar parallax and the infinitesimal corporeal atoms resonating beyond the
planets motions around the sun; he recognized the fixed stars but only in the harmonious
medieval framework. Mathematical precision would be taken by Johannes Kepler in his
transformative fixture of the cosmos both “physical and metaphysical” truth.

Copernican doctrine and its effects
Previously stated, Copernicus’ major corpus was only a revolution-making influence
rather revolutionary text in which barely anyone significantly read. Copernicus text is only
revolutionary in context like that in the book of Ecclesiastes which he was under the same
impression that there was “nothing new under the sun”. Copernicus’s paradox in keeping
tradition allowed a “system…which had profound revolutionary implications were to become
apparent”49. Another tribute to Copernicus tells that,
never…has such a conservative and quiet thinker had such an upsetting effect upon
men’s minds and souls; but seldom has such a conservative thinker been, even
inadvertently, so bold in accepting the improbable50.
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Mathematics was the key to unlock one portion of the heaven that Copernicus calculated to
Newton’s complete system underlying Copernicus’ innovation. Newton’s “mechanical” system
of mathematics in natural philosophy is just the top of the totem pole in the sciences where
Copernicus represents the foundations in which the highest doesn’t without the lowest.
Though Copernican became fundamental in building modern sciences was he also
controversial in expounding unorthodox beliefs that undermined ancient tradition from
Aristotelian philosophy influenced in Christian doctrine. To challenge Aristotle was to challenge
the Church; in no way were Copernicus and Galileo set to challenge Ecclesial authority rather
the physical foundations. There was not such matters as faith versus reason in the sciences for it
became coincidentally aligned to matters that the Church faced during the Protestant reformation
and the lands becoming usurped by the Protestant Lords; this follows later in the Thirty Years
war.
The Copernican doctrine underhanded Aristotelian physics, in scholastic tradition, which
explained man’s position as the center within the universe and the attack of Catholic doctrine in
one passage stated that Joshua commanded the sun to stand still. This divided two groups: those
who follow Copernicus and Aristotle. In one sense, those who regarded themselves as
Copernicans were “seeking escape from what they regarded as the trammels of scholastic
Aristotelianism [which] they turned eagerly to any theory supporting their desire for
innovation”51. The astronomer and mathematician Johannes Kepler held Copernicus as a desire
for innovation in his celestial/religious approach.
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Kepler: celestial and “mystical” calculations
On the point as innovators through Copernicus, the historians of science, like Boas,
viewed the matter that not all astronomers or mathematicians were invited to Copernican
doctrine52. Kepler’s boss, Tycho Brahe, did not hold the Copernican doctrine lightly. Since the
appearance of the new star in the constellation Cassiopeia in 1572, Brahe practiced astronomy,
aside from alchemy and astrology, through his equipment at Uraniborg which observed the
phenomena53 of the great comet of 1577. This is not the controversial figure that the heavens
displayed in modernity which other societies, China, India, Persia, the Polynesians and
Americas, observed the Crab nebulae in 1054 while Christendom Europe was debating the WestEast Schism. In the debate on the Copernican doctrine, Brahe rejected the mathematical-physical
explanations and tried to reconcile Ptolemaic epicycles to Copernicus system like the Egyptian
model with Venus and Mercury’s fast orbital acceleration in comparison to mars: the sun’s orbit
(Copernican model) intersected to the geocentric model (Ptolemaic model)54. This approach did
not come to fruition.
Bruno’s conception on Copernican doctrine was a return of hermetic tradition with
Lucretian cosmology of infinitesimal atoms. The speculation was earlier called by Copernicus’
inquiry of beyond Saturn’s orbit and the distance and size of the immobile sphere. Copernicus
observed that atoms are “imperceptible, they do not immediately constitute a visible body when
they are taken two or a few at a time. But they can be multiplied to such an extent that in the end
there are enough of them to combine in a perceptible magnitude”55. This section of Copernicus’
inquiry transitioned to Bruno’s argument upon the infinity of worlds that Copernicus should have
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gone further. Accordingly, Yates argued no incontrovertible evidence in Copernicus’ esoteric
beliefs but there was a matter of leeway on why Bruno found compatibly with his doctrine.
What really transformed the cosmological model from a closed to infinite universe was
argued in conformation to Koestler’s view in the history of ideas with Johannes Kepler and his
creativity to bring two opposing forces in conjunction. This conjunction of ideas starts on
Pythagoras with cross-disciplinary ideas of mysticism, geometry, morality, arithmetic, and
music, and ended with the separation on faith and reason domain with Plato and Aristotle56.
Though there was an interlude on scientific transformation through political, social, and religious
mentalities in the Middle Ages, Kepler re-integrated the old cosmology from Pythagoras to
mathematicians, astronomers, and physicists in his time. Kepler first began his innovation with
his Mysterium Cosmographicum which attributed a physical/metaphysical speculation of the
cosmos through the geometrization on the planets. In his model57, Kepler places the Copernican
system through the intervals of space filled with the five Pythagorean/Platonic solids on the
planets orbits. From outer to inner distance: cube, tetrahedron (triangular pyramid),
dodecahedron (twelve pentagons), icosahedrons (twenty equilateral triangles), and the
octahedron (eight equilateral triangles). In all would make the mathematic-physical universe of
Copernicus’ model. However it was not the correct scheme to imagine actual solids between
orbits but prompted Kepler’s imagination to go further in calculation.
Kepler’s view, against Bruno’s cosmology, is shown as a religious symbol of the holy
trinity58 within the mathematical order of Copernicus’ model; a mystical property in the number
three in extension to cubes. Kepler saw order and harmony not found “in the infinite and
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therefore perfectly formless – or uniform – universe of Bruno”59. His later works Astronomia
Nova and Harmonices mundi produced his famous three laws of celestial motion within the
Copernican model. His three laws of motion worked under strenuous and tiresome efforts along
his calculations as assistant to Brahe before rigorous frustration on social changes (Thirty Years
War and Persecution of mother as a witch). The first two laws dealt on the matters that
Copernicus’s model was inaccurate of perfect circles instead on its elliptical shapes and
mathematical demonstration on the velocity of planetary objects orbiting around the sun. The
second law pertains to a creative element found earlier in William Gilbert’s De magnete.
Gilbert’s treatise dealt on the properties of loadstone and their occult-like properties of attraction;
this gave influence in Kepler’s model. In Gilbert’s form, there are forces that attract planetary
objects coming closer and repelling when going further; this also demonstrates geometric
proportions that planetary velocity covers the equal distance of surface area from the stationary
sun. However Gilbert’s form was concerned with “an animate mysticism which endows the
Earth with a living forces, and accounts for physical rotation, and for eternal living perfection”60;
Kepler was to make the Earth move.
When Kepler made the Earth move by some mystic force, was “the existence of magnetic
forces within each planet…explained the mysterious property of gravity”61. Now to apply this
motion was difficult in itself with other celestial rotation like Mercury, Venus and especially the
devil himself: Mars. What makes Kepler seen as the new Pythagoras, in Koestler’s eyes, was the
innovation found within the third law. The third law was later known to Galileo and Newton’s
time as the inverse square law that states the mathematical equation that if T, period of
revolution of any planet, and D, mean distance from the sun, then the formula is T2=kD3; where k
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represents the constant62. Such calculation would have been later put together by Newton to
solve the puzzle of God’s universe seen through mathematical properties able to physicists,
astronomers and mathematicians. Kepler’s third did not only explain the scientific approach but
as well the mystic approach through concept of music. Kepler’s belief in the trinity also
transpired, in Kepler’s life, the Pythagorean purge on what numbers display in nature. In the
ancient cosmology, each celestial object resonated a certain sound or oscillated tone as one
would pluck the chord, ½, ¼… etc., the vibrations transcend the frequency into a slower to faster
speed.

“Living” and “moving” forces
Indeed were Copernicus and Kepler “achieved mathematical simplification and a more
harmonious and aesthetically superior theory”63 however there are merely innovative minds in
spectrum of ideas. Koestler writes that
inside these minds, we find no abrupt break with the past, but a gradual transformation of
the symbols of their cosmic experience - from anima motrix into vis motrix, moving spirit
into moving force, mythological imagery into mathematical hieroglyphics - a
transformation which never was, and, one hopes, never will be entirely completed64.
This transformation in the cosmology was not a shaking off of superstition rather a switch in
perception and thinking that one sees as a moving spirit and then a moving force in the
geometrization of space.
What gave this moving force, in itself a transformation can be seen through the side of
weltanschauung in mathematics: geometry. Barfield accounts that geometry, when applied to
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motion, produces the modern outlook of the machine65, or the mechanomorphic outlook. This
machine is seen through geometry in motion in which “bodies can go on moving indefinitely
without an animate or psychic ‘mover’”66. This line of reasoning now shifts the focus of a closed
universe from Copernicus to now the possible infinite world with Newtonian mechanic and the
innovations found with experimental philosophy, mechanic spirit itself, and terrestrial motion.
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CHAPTER FOUR: NEWTON’S SYNTHESIS
What became an innovation to Copernicus through the De revolutionibus, also became a
primary factor through the rise of modern science in the seventeenth century through a process of
mechanomorphic transformation; a transformation moving from a “living” to “moving” force in
application to mathematics. From ancient Rome, Caesar reformed the calendar with Sosigenes of
Alexandria in accordance to Greek mathematics. The result was the Julian calendar, a calendar
whose purpose was to “correctly” align ceremonial, political and religious dates to the Roman
people. The error that accumulated, after the fall of the Roman Empire, were mathematic
precisions of the earth’s alignment in the system by the moon’s and sun’s orbits.
There also included a transformation of not only to “save the appearance”, in a physical
sense, but as well the instrumental usage pertaining to numbers. In Latin Christendom,
Europeans used the Roman numeral symbols I, V, X, L, C, and M, to designate the meaning of
calculations and it changed, during the Crusades, when Italian merchants had an interest of trade
with the Islamic empire at the time1. The offshoot was Leonardo of Pisa’s contribution on the
Hindu-Arabic numerals2. This system of algorithms combated the traditional abacus which
Durant stated that,
only a few mathematicians realized that the new symbols, the zero, and the decimal
alignment of units, tens, hundreds ... opened the way to such developments of
mathematics as were almost impossible with the old letter numerals of Greeks, Romans,
and Jews3.
In the end, algorithms of the Hindu-Arabic numeral won out against the abacus4; however,
mathematicians still relied on abacus systems like calculation charts from the heavens.
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Johannes of Sacroboso used Hindu-Arabic numerals within his calculations of the heaven
in On the Sphere of the World. Along with this treatise and Copernicus’ work did the Catholic
Church and mathematicians revised the calendar from Julian to Gregorian calendar in 1582; from
the Alfonsine to Putenic tables, Kepler revised further with the Rudolphine tables5. Come the
seventeenth century, mathematics had evolved in a different spectrum yet relied on old ideas still
founded by Euclid, Archimedes and Ptolemy. Mathematicians, physicists and astronomers like
Galileo and Newton relied on the refurbished mathematics into new ideas of a mechanomorphic
world where mystic forces can now be explained by experimental and cognitive factors in
epistemology that followed.

Experimental and empirical philosophy
Agrippa recounted that “good” magic alone interacted through all its realms through
natural, celestial and ceremonial magic. In his days, magic was used often to not only construct
pyramids or civic building but as well talking statues and flying swans. Magic had a play in
developing modern science through its invigoration of theoretical knowledge to applicable areas;
however, magic was a hidden element and, in the turn of the seventeenth century, its properties
either had to be assimilated or vanquished to develop the conception of “modern” science.
The new experimental philosophy was brought in by Francis Bacon in introduction, The
New Organon, to his method of logics: induction. To Bacon, his new method was to support a
humanitarian vision of reason where “scientist ought to take up an intermediate position, like that
of bees, which extracted matter from the flowers and then re-fashioned it by their own efforts”6.
The scientist was to look fondly on empirical facts on the world, like bees collecting honey to its
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colony. Bacon’s plan on empirical means was to purpose practicality amongst individuals in
society that “the inquiry into nature is not well founded and properly constructed” and both the
arts and sciences have “innumerable repetitions of the same thing, different in manner of
treatment”7.
Instead of artificial settings like the Royal Society to develop modern notation of
experiments, ancient authority of Aristotle augmented a natural approach by the senses through
the individual from the world. Like Bacon, Margaret Cavendish of Newcastle formed a
philosophy based on sensation and reason in her Observations upon Experimental Philosophy
and took a different approach on experimental philosophy. Where Bacon portrays Aristotle’s
authority as wrong, Cavendish writes that Aristotle
was a very subtle philosopher, and an ingenious man; It is true, he was subject to errors,
as well as other men are…but if all that err should be accounted fools, and destitute of
regular reason, then those deserve it the most , who think, themselves wiser than they
are…8.
Aristotle was no fool as compared to Bacon involvement on the new sciences. What Cavendish
illustrates are the simultaneous forces where modern science was emerging and the old science
retained authority. To Cavendish, the emerging science from Descartes, Galileo and Newton
took on an eclectic form which no system of thought was better or worse than the other yet
emerged scientific innovations as a transitive outlook.
Scientific ideas in cosmology did not only change but as well social-political factions to
finance natural speculation. The early seventeenth century was an emerging world in modern
Europe after Elizabeth’s foreign policies in maritime law9, a demand of land, power, and wealth,
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were the exact methods to achieve such goals. Court science was the traditional manner in
acquiring expediency on numerous projects but became reduced when independents sought
organizations like the Royal Society or Academy in Paris10. In experimental philosophy one
views a social-political outlook emerging conjunctively from the cosmological transformation.

Cartesian philosophy and mechanics
Opposed to empiricism and experimental philosophy, Descartes contributed the method
of doing science through the mind, or cogito, of the world. In his first discourse in the Discourse
on Method, Descartes reminisced on previous experience through his own training of scholastic
training and various ways to get information of the world surrounding him. He later declares that
nothing has shown him anything which he did not previously known or, to some extent, others
(e,g, Cicero, St. Augustine and Al-Ghazali ). Before his eureka of cogito ergo sum, Descartes list
a series of self-evident doubts concerning when to proceed as plan: 1) never to accept anything
true, 2) consider many possibilities, 3) conduct one’s thoughts to any easiest explanation, and 4)
finally to enumerate all possibilities to eliminate11.
Such a method echoes on modern day scientific methodology without empirical
reasoning from internal or external sense. Much of Descartes methodology was to profoundly
change the ways of doing philosophy, in relation to natural philosophy, from a point of view
specifically to the individual or in this case the individual’s cognition. An individual, historian,
and natural philosopher can doubt all causal explanation surrounding the cosmos and the agent’s
design of interpretation but not the existence or mode of thinking that reflects within the inner
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sanctum of the human body which expresses Descartes’ belief in God’s omnipresence or
omnipotence. To Descartes, “the God of a philosopher and his world are correlated”12.
Descartes, like Galileo, sets his philosophy to expand the mathematical-physical sciences
incorporated from mathematics into philosophy: geometrization in the natural world – this sets
the stage in Newton’s natural philosophy. In Alfred Rupert Hall’s From Galileo to Newton, he
remarks the “contest” of natural philosophy between Descartes’ and Newton’s system which
“though Newton himself opposed Descartes directly on almost every issue, it would be absurd to
deny Descartes’ strong influence on him”13. Descartes and Newton had many similarities in their
philosophy that Hall points out, by their titled works, “…it is the Mathematical Principles of
Natural Philosophy as against the Principles of Philosophy…”14; the former deals mathematical
principles within the bounds of nature while the latter deals of pure principles found in nature.
Descartes’ system was self-evidence to the individual where Newton’s system instrumented
mathematics within nature itself.
Descartes’ system of philosophy differs on matters dealing with cosmological schemes
found within the individual compared to Newton’s, which will be dealt later. To Descartes
system, he finds nature to be composed of corpuscular elements that are moved by the unmoved
Agent from Aristotelian philosophy. The issue raised from previous generations was the issue of
the void concept which Kuhn states,
some doubted the void, but the aethereal fluid with which they filled all space was for
most purposes as neutral and inactive as the void. And, most important, all agreed that the
motions, interactions, and combinations of the various particles were governed by laws
imposed by God upon the corpuscles at the Creation15.
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Whether particles were effective as a “living” force to explain such phenomenon, Descartes’
philosophic investigation on corpuscles transitions the mechanomorphic frame of transformation
as “moving” force in the laws imposed by Newton.
To the atomist view, like future space travel, there is no sense of direction by terrestrial
observation that the inhabitants on earth characterizes as up, down, left, right, front and behind.
Scholastic domination forbade the concept of void in nature that gives God’s agency a complex
picture in causing infinite motion without boundaries; in a system of nature, the picture of chaos.
Descartes recognized that in nature do these particles continually change speed16 in accordance
to geometrical instrumentation. The continuous altered state of these particles moving are
“caused by external pushes and pulls derived from other bodies”17. This resembles Newton’s first
law of motion when a body stays in rest until at constant speed or stationary status unless another
body enacts a force dejecting its initial Euclidean right line path or the force enacted on the
object. Such forces are explained through the agency of God but concerning the void makes the
universe full. Descartes’ cosmology takes a turn into the idea of vortexes where the plenum is
recycled through a stream intertwined within the universe itself. This however only explains
certain phenomena of physical appearance such as how comets move through the solar system
and collecting debris.
Such vortexes made by Descartes entail a spiral universe constantly refurbishing
corpuscular elements in accordance to God’s domain. To note, Koyré states that
the Cartesian God, that is, the world of Descartes, is by no means the colorful, multiform
and qualitatively determined world of the Aristotelian, the world of our daily life and
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experience…but a strictly uniform mathematical world, a world of geometry made real
about which our clear and distinct ideas give us a certain and evident knowledge18.
The Cartesian universe and philosophy stem from what Descartes perceived of God yet Koyré
points the critical moment that “he could really think that his inability to conceive, or even
imagine, a finite world could be explained in this way”19. The ability of Descartes’ God is the
ability to detect infinite entities but, as opposed to the individual’s cognition, there become
indefinite entities unknown to the observer. Though Descartes set the Newtonian framework, it is
partial to its fallacy concerning terrestrial motion in celestial mechanics that Galileo undertakes
through his telescope.

Galileo’s terrestrial observations
Descartes and Bacon founded scientific observations through empirical and rational
means to the individual observing nature regardless if nature is observed by instrumental means
through a microscope or telescope. However, there were there no such found experimentation
until the Royal Society and Academy of Science emerged in the late seventeenth century. Such
observations of celestial phenomena became fully observed to Galileo’s dedication of
Copernicus’ system in argumentation of a sun-centered universe. The ulterior motive behind the
Copernican module is to rebuke the Catholic Church’s condemnation of Copernicus’ model
which went against Scriptural authority.
During the issue of the Copernican doctrine, the battle against Aristotelian followers,
religious authority, reached a climax with Galileo’s involvement that contradicts geo-centric
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module of the universe and Holy Scripture. In a letter from Roberto Bellarmine, he writes on the
issue of Galileo and the cosmos that
it is perfectly proper…to say that all the appearances are saved more effectively by the
hypothesis that the Earth moves and the Sun is fixed than by postulating eccentrics and
epicycles; and this is as far as a mathematician can go20.
The proper way that Bellarmine issued Copernican doctrine is solely as a means to a hypothesis
that has no fruition to the mathematician’s role. What about the astronomer as physicist?
In Pierre Duhem’s essay To Save the Phenomena, he presents the dichotomies underlying
the cosmological scheme of celestial objects through the observer’s perspective as either a
mathematician or physicist. The major concern was: did such epicycles or eccentrics exist that
explained the phenomena of celestial movements? In Koestler’s view, they were not essential for
they did not exist21. However, mathematicians postulated a model that calculates the said
phenomena as actual versus a physicist who by uses as instrumental in hypothetical exploration;
this issue remained from antiquity and propelled Kuhn’s justification that it became a monster
which lead Copernicus to simplify.
According to Duhem, astronomical hypotheses, in mathematics, are “simply devices to
save the phenomena”22. After Copernicus’ publication, the period from the Gregorian calendar to
Galileo’s condemnation in 1633 made astronomical hypothesis, from the Greeks, “relegated to
oblivion, or rather, it furiously attacked in the name of the prevailing realism”23. The issue
occurred, again in scholastic debates, the philosophic discussion pertaining to ontology as either
a conceptual, nominal, or realistic framework in the scheme of things that nature prevails and
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distinguishes to the observer. The issue with Galileo was the decline of traditional/authoritative
views of the heavens and a rise to the foundations of modern mathematical-physical sciences.
Much of Galileo’s mechanomorphic cosmos comes from his defense of Copernican
doctrine first played in his earlier recorded celestial phenomenon with A Sidereal Message that
Aristotelian physics were inaccurate on the heavens being perfect in the sublunary sphere.
According to Koyré, the invention of the perspicillum – the Dutch spy glass converted to the
telescope – with his Sidereal Message “played a decisive part in the whole subsequent
development of astronomical science” and “began…a new phase of its development, the phase
that we might call the instrumental one”24. An instrumental phase that speculated further to the
sun’s dark spots, seen in his Letters on Sunspot, which are later, determined the cause of solar
flares with the excess amount of hydrogen re-circulating through its nuclear fusion stages with
star’s mid-point life.
Galileo’s firm defense of Copernican doctrine, with terrestrial observations, is
supposedly expanded in his Dialogues on the Two Chief World System. A dialogue demonstrated
by opposing views of Copernican and Aristotelian doctrine and later reconciled as the victor,
Salviati, successfully rebuking Simplico, a double entendre of Simplicus – commentator of
Aristotle’s works – and the “simpleton” theologian. Though undermined and unfair to scholastic
followers, the dialogue was to impose a positive change of direction in the sciences to “correct”
the Aristotelian system of nature in Ptolemaic-Copernican cosmology with innovative insights
that during Aristotle’s time did not have the luxury.
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Galileo’s argumentation of a moving earth resides in his fourth day discussion on the
issue of tides. There are diurnal, monthly and annual occurrences set forth by the tide which sea
level rises and descends. Mathematics is situated in this discussion but arguable the preference
retains the idea of the Copernican doctrine residing the Earth’s motion in relation to its tide that
proves it as the third planet revolving around the sun. Koestler points that both
the earth’s rotation and its annual revolution are inertial, that is self-perpetuating, and
hence produce the same momentum in water and land; and a combination of the two
motions still results in the same momentum25.
The fallacy shown by the same momentum in relation to one other shows that “he refers the
motion of the water to the earth’s axis, but the motion of the land to the fixed star”; Galileo
cheats his audience by subconsciously adding the stellar parallax absently in this argument26.
A failure on one aspect in this transforming landscape of the cosmos is made up for
mathematical innovation in dynamics and statics in Galileo’s later years. From terrestrial
observations, Galileo implements a mathematical demonstration, with Kepler’s mathematics of
ellipses27, on falling objects by a parabolic curve in observation rather than a tangent curve28 that
the Aristotelians have been viewing on motion single-mindedly. The panoramic view of
terrestrial motion became a mechanomorphic model in mathematical rigor which can calculate
the projectile path of canons and the mind set of calculus before Newton and Leibniz.

Newton’s synthesis
Through Galileo’s achievements, Hall finds that neither “the logic of the mathematical
physics he inaugurated nor its agreement with observable phenomena were quite adequate”29.
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Hall furthers that Galileo’s innovation was immersed through the older sciences which
delineated his “own new perception with sharp definition and entire rigour”30. Progress is made
in accordance to old tradition to fill the gaps of errors that human ingenuity failed through
investigations of the world around them. This is to say the human ingenuity in the sciences is
built up to failure and their successors are more pruned to failure with no exact trail which leads
“cloudy traces”. Not only Galileo but Bacon’s and Descartes’ philosophy; this would incur an
eclectic form that transformed the different scientific methods from the mid-seventeenth century
to nineteenth century.
What constitutes through Bacon, Galileo and Descartes are transformative elements that
are synthesized through Newton’s ingenuity and the innovations of the mechanomorphic
transformation established by Copernicus. Like Galileo, Newton would have to fail even though
all intricate system has been solved mathematically in nature. Morris Kline, in Mathematics: The
Loss of Certainty, argued that the flowering of mathematical truth from the mathematic-physical
sciences declined and lost virtue after Newton’s contribution that distorted mathematics in its
diverse yet related branches: logics, non-Euclidean geometry, statics and dynamics, pure and
applied mathematics. Kline stated the matter towards mathematicians with “the source of insight
is hindsight, and it is with hindsight…that mathematicians finally saw what generations of their
predecessors had failed to see or had seen…”31; this can also be illustrated with Koestler’s
recurring phrase: reculer pour mieux sauter (“to draw back in order to make better”). This frame
of mind not only applied to Newton but as well his predecessors to make out what Newton
investigated through the intricate system, for example, in calculus.
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Newton’s framework of the cosmos and its model was investigated through his Principia,
and its successor Opticks, which created the Newtonian universe. Why it had to fail was in due
process on the order to transform the sciences.
Principia
Prior to Newton’s making of Principia, Newton had already made calculations learning
from the trivialities of Copernicus’ innovation, Kepler’s celestial mechanics and Galileo’s
terrestrial bodies. Hall, editor to Newton’s calculative papers, designated the findings of Newton
circa 166632, around his early Cambridge years, dealing on the issue of falling bodies and the
notion of gravity. Newton’s mathematical endeavor was not the rigorous innovation that he and
Leibniz gave to calculus but simple geometrical skills. Newton states,
Geometry does not teach us to draw these lines, but requires them to be drawn; for it
requires that the learner should first be taught to describe these accurately, before he
enters upon geometry; then it shows how by these operations problems may be solved33.
Geometry, the basic of scholastic teaching and fundamental arts in the quadrivum, gave
Newton’s entire finding through mathematical skills used by art.
The basic understanding to Newton’s mathematics was viewed as empirical and practical
means in the mechanics that nature finds itself to distinguish from physical phenomena. Prior to
Newton, Descartes and Galileo would have divided the dividends of nature in this emerging
science to one sect as minute particles roaming the physical domain or “science seeking
mathematical description rather than physical explanation”34. What made Newton significant in
contribution, according to Koyré’s Newtonian Studies, was “not skill… [rather] his deep
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philosophical mind”35. Creativity roamed around the minds from Copernicus, Kepler and Galileo
to finally see the significance of all three natural philosophers become embedded through
Newtonian mechanism on celestial and terrestrial boundaries.
This is by no means an entire progressive trend that Newton succeeded while others
failed, but a transformation through ingenuity in distinctive stages that the scientist, philosopher
and historian identifies. The idea prevalent in Newton’s mind was mathematical puzzles to be
solved in nature and its distinctions on why one entity moves from another or the inclination that
holds the most heaviest objects in ration of the individual’s place to beyond the celestial stars.
Digressing away from ingenuity, Newton’s inquiry of gravity and falling bodies become
encumbered from Cartesian mechanics that made no calculations of the universe36. The problem
appeared to improve Kepler’s third law, the inverse equation of elliptical orbits and their
acceleration, in respect to forces keeping falling bodies intact. Such of taking Galileo’s
contribution, Newton had formulated in respect the equation that “the force of attraction, F,
between any two bodies of masses m and M, respectively, separated by a distance of r…”37; such
an equation is expressed as F=G (mM/r2), G representing the constant. Such a calculation is
sufficient to help determine what mechanics are at work; however, it gives no physical
explanation. Newton relied mathematical representation to give strenuous explanations on the
matter of comets in which mathematically gives circulates as an ellipse but turns into a parabolic
curve when “force” enacts an attraction further to a high-level mass in the solar system. This
calculation was a collaboration of Edmund Halley’s part which, Newton and him, described the
accurate trajectory path of Halley’s Comet every seventy-five years.
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In Newton’s Principia, he section his findings first through celestial calculations in book
one and terrestrial, particularly on fluids from Galileo’s innovation of tides, in book two.
However trivial the mathematics are concerned on, there are far too rigorous for many
philosophers and historians to speculate in the matter. The idea formulated through Principia is
to announce publicly Newton’s findings prior to publication in 1687 in the Latin vernacular.
Tribulations occurs when the mathematic-physical science progresses through a public realm in
distressing scientist, holding Cartesian physics, to Newton’s defense on his investigation that
concerns the nature of God. Newton’s idea of mathematics is to describe nature through a series
of actual formulations, expressed through numbers and equations, to be able to conduct in a
mathematician’s robe. The formation of the sciences from Copernicus now took a turn to
professionalization in Newton’s time that historians of science investigated through matters from
other scientist opinions, those like Gassendi, Huygens, Hooke, Borelli and Leibniz.
Opticks
Like the Principia, Opticks was another magnanimous treatise concerning the physical
and calculative phenomena in the property of light. As prior to his publication, Newton worked
earlier on light and its predilection to the nature on reflection and refraction. Alhazen theorized a
mathematical treatise that predates geometric composition that rays of light react upon until that
formulation became apparent through Snell’s Law, concerning refraction through passable
mediums. The opponents of physical explanation took Cartesian mechanics that theorized
the particles of the matter of light…pressed outwards from the center of the vortex, or a
flame, must spin as well as travel, a fast spin being perceived as red, a moderate spin as
yellow, [and] a slow spin as blue38.
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Cartesian mechanics explained the emanation of light as corpuscular figures spiraling through a
medium of the vortex. The Aristotelian term aether was still reliant in the modern sciences; both
Huygens and Hook implemented this theory in their experiments.
Newton by contrast did not only experiment through the prism of light and its physical
properties but as well geometrized nature like Al-Hazen’s method through mathematical means.
Newton’s idea of light passes as a spectrum where light is refracted in frequencies attributed to
its wavelength where the human eye perceives the visibility – in a short spectrum between
infrared and ultraviolet – to the cornea. In astronomical methods, Newton’s system prioritizes the
observations of the heavens through light luminosity that details certain objects on mass, density,
volume, heat, distance, acceleration and chemical compositions in the celestial realm.
At the end of Opticks, Newton list queries after his mathematical demonstration into
nature concerning light. Durant, in The Story of Civilization Part VIII, foretells39 Newton’s
demise with Einstein’s relativity when Newton wrote in Query I, “Do not bodies act upon light at
a distance, and by their action bend its rays, and is it not this action strongest at the least
distance?” and Query XXX, “Why may not Nature change bodies into light, and light into
bodies?”. The mathematics and physical sciences do diverge after quantum mechanics sets
precedent into modern physics, mathematics and astronomy but the scheme, or model, set by the
sciences with Copernicus and Newton was to harmonize the universe. This model formulated by
Copernicus and Newton does indeed continue from antiquity to modernity.
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The Newtonian world and its effects
After Newton’s Optics and revised editions of Principia, one views a general picture of
Newton’s world in synthesizing all the emerging sciences at the end of the seventeenth to
beginning eighteenth century. Newtonian mechanics can be described such that from
mathematic-physical investigations can one ascertain the unity of light and matter, corpuscle-like
atoms as indivisible and the non-material attractive and repulsive forces40. Such a system can be
derived from Newtonian mechanics stated further when a Being is put into place as a governing
lord or in its minute roles in nature governing like the shepherd tending his herd of sheep or the
engineer’s mechanistic tinkering on a clock or watch.
A Being that illustrates the theistic attitude in the emerging of modern science, Newton’s
Lord of all calculated the celestial bodies acting on harmonious intervals between the sun, moon
and five planets orbiting the sun and the terrestrial observations on falling with an un-identifiable
force holding these bodies. What could these forces come from? From the General Scholium, he
states: “I have not been able to discover the cause of those properties of gravity from
phaenomena, and I frame no hypotheses”. A conclusion in which Newton himself cannot go
beyond nature with the emerging sciences. What is left is Newton’s conception of such a force is
described through theological discussions like those who from the eleventh to thirteenth
centuries of scholasticism.
Debate: God, Newton, Berkeley, and Leibniz
Newton’s defense of mathematical-physical mechanics implements, after his celestial
observations, that this “most beautiful system of the sun, planets, and comets, could only proceed
72

from the counsel and dominion of an intelligent and powerful Being”41. This powerful being is in
place the order and presence of a Lord that rules dominion of all things within and without God’s
realm. To Newton, this being is an unperceivable entity in which substitutes its attributes,
whatever they maybe, upon the world. This description of God is only Newton’s interpretation of
God; this creates problems like Descartes’ cosmology through God.
Bishop Berkeley pointed the issue towards absolute space which Newton’s God claims
dominion of all natural things. To Berkeley, he does not accept the notion of absolute space in
which an unperceivable reality is unthinkable42. How can one claim absolute space without the
essential attributes of perception? This line of questioning disrupts not only the underlying
scientific investigations but theological perceptions of a divine entity. To Newton, God is like a
clock-maker in which, after created, the world participates without God’s intervention only when
necessary; causing such phenomenon to the religious individual as miracles. To Berkeley, God’s
essence in a mechanic world is without due when he acclaims to words esse est pricipi (“to be is
to be perceived”) and not “occasionally perceived”.
The German polymath Leibniz added in the Newtonian debate on the scheme of time
with his concept of pre-established harmony. Somewhat esoteric in meaning, Leibniz illustrated
a different mode in expressing Newton’s world on differential space-time structure whether it is
compact on what he called monads or space & time entities. A philosophical follow up into his
notion of theodicy and God’s eternal position that does not make God a watch-maker or shepard
but a part of the cosmos and sufficient reason; this becomes ridiculed in Voltaire’s Candide
questioning such sufficient reasoning from the 1755 earthquake in Lisbon43.
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A “closed world to infinite universe”?
What Berkeley and Leibniz pointed in Newton’s absolute space & time universe as
infinite, is perfectly summed up by Koyré last words on the subject:
The infinite Universe of the New Cosmology, infinite in Duration as well as in Extension,
in which eternal matter in accordance with eternal and necessary laws moves endlessly
and aimlessly in eternal space, inherited all ontological attributes of Divinity. Yet only
those – all the others the departed God took away with Him44.
The inherited attributions of the universe relied on Newton’s model of God and the universe. A
model similarly conjectured to Descartes’ model; the one he went against on vortexes and
motion.
What one sees in Newton’s synthesis of the cosmos transforms Copernicus closed world
of finite space to Newton’s infinite universe. The question becomes now: was there a
transformation of the cosmos from a “closed world to infinite universe”? Shockingly to say, the
answer is both yes and no. Yes because Copernicus’ heliocentric model paved skepticism in the
cosmology beyond the Earth’s place as a moving unit through space rather a stationary figure.
With Kepler and Galileo, the mechanomorphic figuration transfers the epistemological changes
through the mathematical-physical sciences to help explain the motion of the universe. From
there, Newton synthesized a coherent structure that kept order in space, time, motion, and
extension in place different from Copernicus’ time.
Yet, the answer was no because Copernicus had doubts on a closed world and
investigated further beyond the fixed stars, an invigoration before Newton came into picture. The
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surprisingly strange the notion on “saving the appearance”, though ridden from Kepler’s ellipses,
still held a different but subtle meaning as a coherent picture that infinity was not all-pervading
through atoms or corpuscles but the agency of God. The idea of God’s agency is as old as
Aristotle concerning the First Mover which, according to Cavendish45, still held some authority
in the emerging new science. Such anachronism continues, from Scholasticism, into Newton’s
universe.
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION
To summarize, inquires used to investigate cosmology, from a “closed world to infinite
universe” developed by Koyré, were the disciplines in history and philosophy. I used historical
and philosophical investigations because they had an interconnected realm of knowledge, stated
by Durant, Ibn Khaldun, and Kuhn, which I thinks applies to an interdisciplinary approach. My
line of argumentation was to clarify that the history of science1 was not a one-sided approach in
Whig history, like stimulus and response in behaviorist psychology2, rather a multi-approach in
the transformation of the sciences. Rather than viewing superstitious or anachronistic elements
cloaking human ingenuity, these elements act as transformative insights into the overall
transformation of sciences.
After examining Butterfield’s interpretation on Whig history, I later examined his and
Koyre’s early developmental philosophy in the history of science. To expand their notions, I
furthered into Michel Foucault’s and Thomas Kuhn’s philosophies when both examine the
epistemological changes in history3. Between the French philosophers Sartre and Levi-Strauss, I
wedged Foucault’s philosophy between opposing sides on human nature in its freedom and
similarity found within culture. Foucault’s philosophy was found dominantly in the Order of
Things which the human sciences, anthropology, sociology, and psychology, transformed from a
different order in philology, biology and economics. Foucault’s insight was the geometrization of
the sciences within the planes from epistemic breaks in history to where one discipline ends and
one emerges; his reversal back within mathematical and physical science can relate to Kuhn’s
level of science.
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Illustrated by Hacking, their differences become the maturity of science: Foucault’s
approach was immature and Kuhn’s was mature. Foucault’s philosophy in the history of science
was never maturing due to epistemic breaks caused by power relations on both an individual and
natural aspect. Foucault’s picture was a line of non-continuity, yet continuous, which the gaps
are created with no big picture of geometrical knowledge versus Kuhn line of continuity in the
history of science as a line of filled gaps in geometrical knowledge. These so-called gaps are his
notion of paradigm shifts caused by normal science within a community of divergent scientists
and their perceptions, within themselves reflecting the change from old to new models. Kuhn
implicated a gestalt theory of psychology when perceiving certain phenomena through a
weltanschauung approach as the paradigms switches from one point of view simultaneous to
another instantly as though two opposing forces appear apparent to the observer. Though both
philosophies in the history of science are different, I view the concept of transformation that
Kuhn’s picture completes Foucault’s picture in history.
From the philosophic point of view, I transitioned to a historic view in the scientific
revolution. Whether the scientific revolution occurred or not, something happened between
Copernicus’ to Newton’s time through the re-configuring cosmology instrumental with the
mathematics and physics. The first half dealt in Copernicus’ influence from hermetic, humanist
and scholastic background in which Copernicus model the geocentric to heliocentric model of
cosmology in De revolutionibus. Though inaccurate, its main inspiration transpired to fellow
mathematicians, scholars, philosophers and astronomers of the heliocentric model and its “saving
appearance” phenomena. Kepler took the model of the cosmos to correct its malformation
through his mystic-mathematic approach of celestial objects first worked in his Mysterium
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Cosmographicum. From there, his development of his three laws implemented a
mechanomorphic outlook that emphasized mathematics/geometry as a “moving” versus “living”
force.
The second half dealt with the transitioning mechanomorphic view of the cosmos with
Galileo and Newton. Still inherent of traditional mathematics and sciences, the philosophers
Bacon and Descartes viewed the sciences as experimental and cognitive matters when perceiving
phenomena of nature. The missing half of Newton’s synthesis was Galileo’s terrestrial motion in
part with Kepler’s celestial motion. Galileo’s s defense of Ptolemaic-Copernican cosmos, in his
Dialogue of Two Systems, failed against the explanation of the earth as a moving object. Through
failure, one sees his geometrization of space with terrestrial observations from his earlier
investigation on the telescope. Following Galileo, Newton synthesized Copernicus’ model with
Kepler’s celestial and Galileo’s terrestrial motion into a mathematical rigor in his Principia and
mathematics measured in natural philosophy. The surprising element in Newtonian mechanics
still relied on the medieval model of God’s intervention of the infinite world. This allows within
the boundaries as either Copernicus looking ahead while Newton was looking back. Yet,
simultaneously, Copernicus was working within the tradition of the “closed world” through
Ptolemaic astronomy and Newton expanding Galileo’s and Kepler’s mechanics to open an
“infinite universe”.

Transformation and its effects on history
How can Copernicus be looking backward yet forward and Newton is looking forward
yet backwards? A play of actions characterizes external (environment) and internal
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(consciousness) forces throughout the investigations in the history of science and its
transformations. What these actions entail are not exact to my specific inquiries since it relies on
a lessons of history approach. By lessons on history, what role does transformation, particularly
on the sciences investigated, affect the outcomes or results in history? Receiving this answer
entails a point in discussion that involves the models of history and it cosmology of how things
occur. Earlier, I mention one model that I denied heavily on the Whig model of history that
showed its one-sidedness and its liberating factor. I propose on three models of history in this
transforming landscape of knowledge, science and philosophy.
Progressive. Unlike Whig history, a progressive outlook does not entirely show its one-sidedness
as things accumulate within each successive step in human history or its creativity. Nothing is
victorious or liberated in a sense for things become well than their preceding successors. An
image on progress can be seen through a totem pole where certain spirits and ancestor are
depicted on success and improvements from past successions. The only key figure to highly pay
attention in progresses is its roots or foundations in which a totem pole was first erected from a
mound; one can say “the highest does not stand without the lowest”4 or “standing on the
shoulders of giants”.
Cyclical. Opposite in progressive, a cyclical outlook never becomes better or worse than its
successors. Liberation as a whole is not the key rather for minute details that need to be learning
if one needs not repeat history5. Two such illustrations can represent cyclical history as Russian
dressing dolls and LP records. The former model shows the similarity of dolls encapsulating one
another through structure and shapes but a difference emerges through designs that one views the
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intricate lines and symbols beautifying the dolls; the viewer of history must pay attention of
details. Though minute details can be picked easy in repetitiveness, the latter illustration shows
the repetitive disruptions through the circular disc of harmony by mechanical interventions of the
needle.
Reflective/Refractive. Similar in cyclical but different in structure as the refraction of lights to
dispersing its rays of different colors; its intensity and quaintness is shown through a morphed
version of cyclicality. Like Leibniz’s theodicy and Voltaire’s reaction on the best of possible
worlds, there is a differentiation of forces acting simultaneous to its similarities; a simpler way to
illustrate is Indra’s Net6. In this analogy, all gems represent a world in which inter-connections
occurs through the refraction or reflections of light emitting from the source and within the
gemstone themselves or on to others. In one instance, progress happens while another action
causes decline through a different world or civilization.
Through the models of history, transformation occurs through the Whig, progressive,
cyclical and reflective/refractive approach. The lessons sought in history and its model can be
seen on what I think on the reflective /refractive approach since transformation has its
multiplicity in history from one local point to another. In last remarks on transformations, what
can be observed through the intermediary local point is the notion found through creativity and
education.
On creativity
Koestler’s theory of creativity brings two geometrizing planes of knowledge interesting
from tradition and innovation to spark creativity, like rubbing two sticks with flint to produce
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fire. With the philosophy in history of science, Koestler’s geometrization of intersecting planes
with creativity7 into Foucault’s intersecting planes, along with Kuhn’s fill-in with paradigm
shifts, into the human sciences8. In terms to the general activity of creativity, Koestler states the
act of creation “does not create something out of nothing; it uncovers, selects, re-shuffles,
combines, synthesizes already existing facts, ideas, faculties, skills. The more familiar the parts,
the more striking the new whole"9.
Creativity as wholes and parts integrates a different sense in the history of science where
he mentions the discoveries in science are not always clear. The path science takes often maps as
zigzags where it
often consists...in the uncovering of a truth buried under the rubble of traditional
prejudice, in getting out of cultural-de-sacs into which formal reasoning divorced from
reality leads; in liberating the mind trapped between the iron teeth of dogma10.
This is to demonstrate that the transformation of the sciences has no clear understanding relating
from past actions and learning them to create things.
The matter can be looked with Copernicus’ treatment of his major publication on the De
revolutionibus. Translated from a letter from Lysis to Hipparchus, one pivotal idea that
Copernicus drew was the fact Lysis argued that
certain imitators of his [Pythagoras] teaching, however, perform at great length and out
loud. Their instruction of the young follows a confused and improper procedure, thereby
making their auditors impertinent and brash. For they mix disorderly and tainted morals
with philosophy's lofty precepts. The result is like pouring pure fresh water into a deep

83

well full of muck, since the muck is stirred up and the water is wasted. This is what
happens to those who teach and are taught in this manner…11.
Koestler asks: “Why did Copernicus, after ten years spent in the bubble-bath of Renaissance
Italy, adopt this arrogantly obscurantist and anti-humanistic attitude?”12 The answer given
because Copernicus saw his ingenuity of the cosmos subtle of par-excellence and the fear of
ridicule from the public as prejudice builds off Ptolemaic tradition; hence pure fresh water into a
deep well full of muck, since the muck is stirred up and the water is wasted. He considered his
work of creative enterprise but would become a major concern of Ptolemaic tradition still used in
society: individual’s perceptions of the universe and academia/scholasticism use of tradition.
In Kepler’s Rudolphine Tables, the font piece illustrates the glorious, or whiggish,
attitude in building the sciences from Hipparchus, Ptolemy, Copernicus, and Brahe. Contrary,
Kepler places himself melancholy at the base where the matter is viewed on the foundations as a
pile of mud from ancient tradition. Kepler’s investigations of the cosmos were idiosyncratic due
to science as “physical and metaphysical” elements like Pythagoras’ religious nature in
mathematics. Though at the bottom, Kepler had to start on the foundations of science, whether
he like them or not, in order to climb higher than shoulders of giants or totem pole of previous
ancestors. Newton’s work was described as “no other work in the whole history of science equals
the Principia as either in originality and power of thought, or in the majesty of achievement”13
but, as an individual, “he was moody, sometimes irritable, suspicious, secretive, always timid but
proud” and as “high strung and morbidly sensitive, he bore criticism painfully, resented it
sharply, and fought back stoutly in controversy”14. Newton’s achievements are contradictory
innovation from mathematical rigor and sour determination to achieve fame.
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On education
In Kuhn’s last chapter of The Copernican Revolution, Kuhn relates Copernicus’ multiple
yet single fabric of thought following Kepler’s celestial mechanics, Galileo’s terrestrial
mechanics, and Newton’s infinite universe, with interrelated connections of science. To Kuhn, he
thought – the matter transitioning from nature (physics) to history and its different frameworks –
nature does not
display incompatible properties in different fields. If the physicist’s electrons can leap
path to path without crossing the intervening space, then the chemist’s electron should
have the same ability, and the philosopher’s concept of matter and space demand
reëxamination. Every fundamental innovation in a scientific specialty inevitably
transforms neighboring sciences and, more slowly, the worlds of the philosopher and the
educated layman15 [my italics].
The neighboring science from astronomy, physics and mathematics transcends through biology,
chemistry, and politics16. This web follows a line of continuous interest where “each new
conceptual scheme embraces the phenomena explained by its predecessors and adds to them”17.
This web of interest, particularly from history and philosophy, stems as a local point in
transformation with the value of education. Education and the technique practice is the virtuoso
in interdisciplinary knowledge across the board. The essence underlying education standardizes
the equilibrium between contradictory rises, falls, and decays in civilizations seen throughout
history being recorded. The knowledge accumulated from Copernicus to Newton is only one
spectrum in part of civilization which it identifies itself as
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not something inborn or imperishable; it must be acquired anew by every generation, and
any serious interruption in its financing or its transmission may bring it to an end. Man
differs from the beast only by education, which may be defined as the technique of
transmitting civilization18.
The individual is between perplexing worlds when creating and transmitting knowledge. The
matter pertains how valuable the spectrum of epistemoligcal changes occur and how they are
picked up.
In its dogma and liberation of the sciences or any area of knowledge, the value of
education finds the inner meaning when investigating philosophy and history. I think the lessons
of history are theory and practice base that one continually must observe carefully regardless of
things being anachronistic. Through the process in transmitting knowledge and its constitutions,
there follows a transformation starting from cosmology and trickling down to its interdisciplinary
areas of knowledge from civilization.
Notes
[1] The cosmology, astronomy, physics, and mathematics instrumental in the inquiry
[2] See Koestler’s The Act of Creation (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1964). He notes the
behaviorist model in discourse on Book II, Chapter IV, particularly pages 603-604.
[3] Foucault’s analyzes history as epistemic breaks where Kuhn’s analyzes history as paradigm shifts.
Both write epistemological changes but in different contexts – Foucault looks in biology (biomedical
sciences) and Kuhn in physics.
[4] C.S. Lewis, The Four Loves (New York: Hancourt, Brace, 1960), pg. 9
[5] Santayana: “Those who do not know from history are doomed to repeat”
[6] I found Indra’s Net analogy illustrated in Timothy Brooks’ Vermeer’s Hat: The Seventeenth Century
and the Dawn of the Global World (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2008). Brook’s describes Indra’s Net
(22) as
mirrors reflecting the multiplicity of causes and effects that have produced the past and the
present. Buddhism uses a similar image to describe the interconnectedness of all phenomena. It is
called Indra's net. When Indra fashioned the world, he made it as a web, and at every knot in that
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web is tied a pearl. Everything that exists or has ever existed, every idea that can be thought
about, every datum that is true every dharma, in the language of Indian philosophy is a pearl in
Indra's net. Not only is every pearl tied to every other pearl by virtue of the web on which they
hang, but on the surface of every pearl is reflected every other jewel in the net. Everything that
exists in Indra's web implies all else that exists.
[7] See Arthur Koestler, The Act of Creation (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1964), pgs. 33-35,
37-38, and 85
[8] Look back in Chapter 2, pg. 23
[9] Koestler, pg.120
[10] Koestler (1959), pg. 214
[11] Copernicus, pg. 29
[12] Koestler, pg. 153
[13] Hall, pg. 301
[14] Durant (1963), pg. 545
[15] Kuhn, pg.230
[16] ibid, pg.263
[17] ibid, pg. 264
[18] Durant (1935), pg. 4

87

APPENDIX: KOESTLER’S TABLE
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Planets
Earth
Diurnal rotation…
Motions in Longitude…
Conic motion of earth’s axis
to account for its fixed
direction in space and for
precision
Two rectilineal oscillations to
account for (imaginary)
fluccession and in the value of
the obliquity; resolved into 2
circular motion
Moon
Motions in longitude…
Motion in latitude…
Three Outer Planets
Motions in longitude 3x3=
Oscillations in latitude
resolved into 2 circular
motions apiece, 3x2=…
Venus
Motions in longitude…
3 oscillatory motions in
latitude resolved into 6
circular motions…
Mercury
Motions in longitude
(including one oscillatory
motion)
Motions in latitude (as Venus)
Total epicycles=

De revolutionibus

Commentariolus

1
3

1
1

1

1

4

N/A

3
1

3
1

9

9

6

6

3

3

6

2

5

5

6
48

2
34
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